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THE COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE FORTRESS OF PORT ARTHUR, DURING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In the beginning of 1904 Port Arthur was a Russian station and had been designated as the official winter station for the Russian fleet. The prominence attached to it by the Russians and its importance to Japan, made it a matter of contention from the earliest moment of the war. As it afforded a reasonably good refuge for the opposing fleet it became imperative for Japan to destroy it at the earliest possible date.

The earlier history of the place and the manner in which it became a Russian possession will throw some light upon the present issue and help to clear up certain points that may come up later.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF PORT ARTHUR

EARLY POLICIES

Six days after the French and British allies had withdrawn from Peking in 1860, Russia and China concluded a treaty of the highest importance to Russia, whereby the eastern coast of Manchuria from the Amur to the Korean frontier, a district known later as the Maritime Province, was ceded to Russia. This and other efforts by Russia to approach the coast of the Sea of Japan were viewed by Japan with apprehension. During the period between 1861 and 1894 China and Japan

had several differences concerning Korea. In 1885 an agreement was drawn up which continued until 1894 when a rebellion broke out in the Korean province. In the existing arrangement China and Japan were to have equal power in regulating Korea and each maintained a specified force in this country. In case either increased its force the other country was to be notified at once. In 1894, China, at the outbreak of the rebellion, sent 2000 troops to the scene and notified Japan. The latter occupied Fusan and Chemulpo with a mixed brigade. Japan had by this time become tired of the conditions of misrule there and, as China still claimed suzerainty over the province, insisted upon some guaranty of stable government in the province, and demanded reforms therein. But to this China refused to accede and after some delay and fruitless negotiations, hostilities began resulting in the Chino-Japanese war.

Japan was successful and China sued for peace, and the result of peace negotiations was a treaty drawn up at Shimonoseki, Japan, in which China recognized the full and complete independence of Korea, ceded Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung Peninsula, and paid an indemnity of about 25,000,000 pounds sterling. The provision ceding the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, if carried into effect would crush Russia's hopes for an open port on the Pacific and the dismemberment of China might be indefinitely postponed. Before this treaty was ratified France, Germany, and Russia joined in suggesting to Japan that she should forego the claim to territory on the mainland as it would threaten the lasting peace of the Far East. Japan was not prepared to resist such a combination and accepted the advice of the three powers, receiving about 5,000,000 pounds sterling instead of the Liaotung Peninsula.

BOXER COMPLICATIONS

During the Boxer rebellion Russia occupied Manchuria and under the final treaty thereafter, Russia was to evacuate that province. The evacuation of the territory was to take place in three sections of six months each. The first took place on time but the second did not and upon inquiry by the Chinese Minister as to the matter Russia presented seven requirements that should be fulfilled before evacuation would be continued; it was evident that China would not yield thereto. Great Britain, the United States and Japan

formally lodged complaint against these new Russian demands, and finally on the 20th of April China refused compliance therewith. After this there was much negotiation, and many efforts were made to come to an agreement upon the questions. On January 13, 1904, Japan replied for the last time and pressed an early answer since it was known that Russia was improving her army and navy in the Far East. On February 6th negotiations were broken off by Japan and the Japanese Minister informed the Russian government that he had been directed to withdraw from Russia. Port Arthur was attacked on the night of the 8th of February.

MILITARY IMPORTANCE

Although Port Arthur, previous to its occupation by the Japanese in 1894, was an inconspicuous fishing village, it had increased in importance in a political and strategical sense as time went on, and in 1903 and 1904 became an important prize for which both nations were about to strive in a titanic struggle. At the beginning of the war a large part of the Russian fleet was based on Port Arthur and at that time their Pacific fleet was substantially equal to, if not superior to the fleet of Japan.

Japan had never forgotten or forgiven the action of the powers which had deprived her of her just reward of victory, and quietly bided her time when an opportunity would be presented for retaking the place by force. For ten years she silently prepared for that event. Japan therefore, in 1904, had sentimental as well as political and economical reasons for her great and persistent efforts against Port Arthur.

The importance of Port Arthur, the proportion, duration and unique methods employed in the siege, present to the military student a wide field for investigation. The information that a careful analysis will extract therefrom will be valuable and useful in reference to similar cases in the future. In some respects use has already been made of deductions from study of the conditions in the fortress during 1904.* So far as is known to the writer, however, the benefits resulting from such study have been chiefly limited to material considerations; no treatment of the subject as herein proposed has been observed. Material defects are usually the first to be

* *The defense of Port Arthur.* Von Schwartz and Romanovski.

The Influence of the Experience of the Siege of Port Arthur upon the Construction of Modern Fortresses. Von Schwartz.

noticed, and are most easily identified and corrected. Any one can detect them and as a rule suggest a remedy.

In matters of organization and administration, where the element in man alone is involved, the subject is complex from the start, and successful operation demands the highest qualifications. In fact, complexities arise at every turn. The chief who is charged with the solution of such a problem should be firm, persistent, patriotic, of wide experience in human nature, keen in fathoming motives, of high integrity, and possess sufficient knowledge and ability to command respect and at least a certain amount of admiration from his subordinates.

The present case presents a composite result for consideration, with evidence as to the procedure of several of the prominent actors.

As the drama enacted at Port Arthur unfolds, it will be seen that all the motives, both positive and negative, which actuate men, played their parts and seriously complicated the stage setting and, in many cases, nullified the achievements of the players. Motives of patriotism and treachery, courage and fear, generosity and envy, friendship and hate, truth and falsehood, efficiency and incompetency, wisdom and ignorance, criticism and flattery, strove so actively at cross purposes that the exact influence of each will never be known. In the present controversy we are dealing with the past actions of a group of human beings under great strain. To estimate, separately, the effect of each of the numerous mental, moral, and psychological agencies that were operating in, through, and amongst this group of men differing widely in character and antecedents, would be desirable but is impossible owing to incomplete data and lapse of time.

In our problem it is evident that deficient facilities, incompetent personnel, lack of definite ideals, non-arrival of reinforcements from the outside and a thousand other influences might react upon the situation and materially affect the outcome and thereby reduce this quest to an apparently hopeless undertaking.

The real issue is to eliminate from the result the effects of all agencies except those pertaining to Organization and Administration of the Fortress and through the process ascertain whether or not the systems in use were satisfactory or otherwise, and definitely identify any defects that may be found to exist therein. In the future, efficient systems of organization

and administration will be required for our own large commands and even a knowledge of the defects of former systems will teach us what to avoid in our service and will go a long way towards establishing our own systems upon sound bases, and producing structures to withstand the test of war.

SOURCES AND NATURE OF EVIDENCE AVAILABLE

To arrive at definite conclusions credible evidence must be obtained. Published accounts of the great siege are abundant but in many cases the statements can not be verified, or compared with reliable standards. In the following account doubtful statements have not been considered, and all matter has been carefully sifted and examined in the light of authoritative accounts in order to secure conclusions of reasonable accuracy.

After reading many volumes relating to the siege it was decided to accept the translation of the report of the Russian General Staff* as the most reliable basis of comparison and measure of accuracy. This report appears to be fair and not to favor anyone where criticism is due, makes no effort to cover defects and wrong doing where they exist and, in general, the statements agree with same made by independent writers just after the capitulation.

The report of the Russian General Staff and other reliable sources show that the organization of the fortress was very backward and was scarcely begun when the attack was made. On this date all considerations with respect to the administration of the fortress, just in process of formation, were matters for the future. The outbreak of war brought such urgent and rapid demands upon the authorities for organization and administration that little or no time was available for study of the needs of the case and perfect systems could not be expected. Surprise therefore need not arise from defects which came to the surface but from the fact that anything practicable was developed and adopted. The great siege has come and gone and it might be permitted to rest in peace were it not for the value that is to be gained from digging down into it once more for the purpose of ascertaining the sound principles which its systems embraced and the unsound ones which should be avoided in the future.

About two years after the capitulation, Nojine, official

* Translated by First Lieutenant Walter J. Büttgenbach, Coast Artillery Corps, United States Army.

Russian war correspondent at Port Arthur, during the siege, and in charge of the *Novy Kry* in the fortress wrote a book entitled *The Truth about Port Arthur*, in which he presents charges of the gravest character against Generals Stoessel and Fock and members of Stoessel's staff. To a reader not familiar with the details of the situation his account appears to be partisan. Some time after the publication of this book charges were preferred against the two officers mentioned above, against General Reis—Stoessel's chief of staff—and Lieutenant-General Smirnoff who was the real Commandant of the Fortress. These charges were so similar to those stated in Nojine's book that it seemed probable that they had been based upon the same. This was not the case but the book evidently added interest and impetus to the trials which followed. All the important accusations in *The Truth about Port Arthur* were embodied in the charges against the above named officers and the same allegations are embraced in the report of the Russian General Staff. In reference to important events at least it may be assumed that the accusations of Nojine were not overstated. He presents many details affecting the bad conditions in Port Arthur during the siege, particularly in reference to vicious administration. His statements wherever covered by other and wholly impartial writers, are substantially confirmed. He appears to have been a patriotic man and to have had some influence amongst the authorities at St. Petersburg. His account is accepted as correct unless at variance with some other reliable authority.

Then there are several war correspondents who were with the Third Japanese Army during the siege, and who entered the fortress after the capitulation. These men were not slow in estimating the situation and in publishing accounts of their observations. They all present a remarkable agreement as to existing conditions at the end, and, in so far as they cover the subject, they are in accord with the report of the Russian General Staff.

The charges preferred against the officers in question resulted from an investigation by a commission of certain allegations made by General Smirnoff against Stoessel and Fock.

Colonel Roop was president of the commission that investigated the circumstances of the surrender of the fortress and it was upon the findings of this commission that the charges were based. Parts of the report of Colonel Roop are

important as evidence in the case and furnish reliable information.

The written defense of Stoessel and Fock each in his own case before this commission, Stoessel in connection with his trial, and Fock in connection with the Roop commission, throws light upon the men and their motives and is valuable in the present case. It often happens that a man in trying to excuse himself of certain misdoings will throw more side lights upon his character and motives than can be effected in any other manner, and this may be said of the two officers mentioned above.

The principal sources of evidence therefore consist of the following authorities.

1. Report of the Russian General Staff.
2. Histories and reliable reports.
3. Nojine's *Truth about Port Arthur* and his other writings.
4. War correspondents with the Third Japanese Army.
5. Reports of committees of investigation of the charges made against officials of Port Arthur, and statements of officers under charges.
6. Special reports of military attachés.

The views of the Russian General Staff will be given by quotations from its report with special reference to the main issues involved. Quotations from other sources will be designated by reference to the source and authority from which taken.

THE REPORT OF THE RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF

At the head of the civil administration of the entire Kwangtung District was a Civil Commissioner, attached to the Commanding General—generally an officer of the rank of colonel—whose duties were assimilated to that of governor in Russia; under his control was the police of Port Arthur and the District officials—also officers. Thus in his hands was centered the entire administrative machinery of the Kwangtung District, with the exception of Dalni, which had its own municipal government. Members of the town council (magistrates), were the town doctor, the chief of police, town building inspector, a representative of the War Ministry, of the Navy, and of Finance, and three representatives from the town. During the war the chairman of the town council, Lieutenant-Colonel Morschinin carried out the duties of the Civil Commissioner.

Looking at the theater of war, it will be clear to any one that nature aided materially in converting Port Arthur into a powerful fortress. All circumstances favored this as the place of refuge for the squadron in the Pacific Ocean. In how far, these gifts of nature were utilized will become evident in the further history of operations.

Occupation of the Fortress

Without entering into the details of the political situation in connection with the Russian occupation of Port Arthur and the Kwangtung Peninsula, a few remarks upon the question at that time will now throw light upon the matter considered and help to form the background for the circumstances which led up to the siege of the place.

About the 1st of December, 1897, the ships of the Russian fleet went to Port Arthur for their winter station. On the 21st of March, 1898, the steamer *Sswar* and two of the Russian volunteer fleet proceeded from Vladivostok and anchored off Port Arthur, having aboard the 1st Battalion of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment, 4 guns of the First Battery, 1st East Siberian Rifle Brigade, and one section of Werchneudinsk Regiment of the Transbaikal Cossacks. The Squadron, at that time, was commanded by Admiral Dubassow.

On March 26th, pursuant to agreement with General Ssun, the Chinese Commander, it was agreed by China that the Chinese forces at Port Arthur were to evacuate the place on the 27th of March; the treaty was signed by the two powers and the Liaotung Peninsula became the property of Russia. On March 28th three ships were placed at the disposal of General Ssun for the purpose of removing his troops.

In October, 1898, there were at Port Arthur or in the vicinity, eight battalions of infantry, two of fortress artillery, three batteries of twenty-four guns of field artillery, one Cossack regiment, a company of sappers, three hospitals, two magazines, and twenty pieces of heavy artillery, the last being on the sea front.

After Port Arthur had been occupied by Admiral Dubassow, Colonel Wogak, General Staff, and Engineer Colonel Wasiljewski examined the country and agreed that the line of defense of the fortress must be pushed out beyond the line of the Wolf Hills. Later a report was made by Lieutenant-General Kenonowitsch-Corbazki, sent out by the department in October, 1898, containing the conclusions that the place must

be converted into a land fortress with strong permanent works and a strong garrison to resist a superior attacking force for a long period; that the line of the main defense must contain Takushan, Dragon Hill, Temple Height, the "Eckberg" group, High Hill, Panluntshan, Waldschneppen Hill, Salzberg and White Wolf. Liaoteshan was to be held as an observation point. The armament was to consist of 593 guns, 82 mortars and 18 companies of fortress artillery. The coast defense was to be strengthened by guns of great caliber and longer range—twelve 25-cm. guns, twelve 15-cm. guns, and sixteen 28-cm. guns. For the defense of Kwangtung it was estimated that at least 20 battalions of infantry with field artillery, 1 regiment of Cossacks and 18 companies of fortress artillery would be required.

He further reported that the positions of Kinchou as well as the country between Yunk and Victoria Bays should be strongly fortified. This report was submitted in April, 1899, and the War Minister, General Kuropatkin, considered it with care, after which the latter came to the conclusion that the question should be gone over in conference with the Chiefs of the Engineer and Artillery Administrations; that in his opinion it would be necessary to settle upon a line of defense further in, containing several forts which would withstand heavy attacks, and requested that Admiral Alexieff be called in for final decision. From remarks upon this report by General Kuropatkin it is clear that the Ministry of War fully realized the necessity for a proper system of fortification for the Kwangtung, but sought to limit the cost thereof if possible.

A special board was then ordered consisting of State Secretary Sscolski, the Imperial Secretary, the Ministers of War, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, and the Head of the Navy Department, which was to determine absolutely the outlay necessary for the fortification of the Kwangtung. The opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs throws light on this question. On May 29th he said:

At present the condition of international affairs does not in any way menace our gradually fortifying the Kwangtung Peninsula. One such can only arise by lack of care in our case or by progress too rapid. One must not forget that the principal defense of Port Arthur, since the Russian flag has been raised there, does not depend on those troops that may be there but on the fact that all nations know that behind this place stands all of Russia.

This same point of view was held by other members of the

board, but the Finance Minister added thereto that the demands of the Ministry of War should be somewhat curtailed from what the original scheme of fortification for the Kwangtung had shown. Although General Kuropatkin invited the attention of the Committee to the fact that during the time that the peninsula was held by the Chinese the requirements of the defense of the place had been worked out by western engineers who had found that it would require at least 20,000 men and 350 guns. The estimates of the Ministry for War were reduced to 11,300 men and 150 guns. Cost, careful or conservative state policy, and extreme confidence in the bravery of the Russian soldier were the chief considerations in this far-reaching conclusion. It was further recommended that the Ministry should not increase this number of troops because it would not only be an additional expense to the state but in addition would introduce a serious political danger.

The conclusions of this board were binding on the Minister of War and he was obliged to execute them and was limited to the amounts of money based thereon. Finally Colonel Velicho of the Engineers, in 1899, was sent to Port Arthur with full powers. He was directed to determine the places and positions for the fortifications according to plan and, if this plan was not objected to by the military authorities at Port Arthur, was authorized to give immediate orders for beginning the work.

Project of Fortification

Colonel Velicho's scheme counted upon works that would require a garrison of 14,000 to 15,000 men. A Commission was named whose plan of fortification was approved on June 30, 1900. According to this plan, the sea front called for 124 guns arranged in 22 batteries, and the land front for 418 guns and 48 machine guns, the latter being divided into two fronts known as the east and the west fronts.

The work of construction of the forts actually commenced before June 30, 1900. Ample and timely appropriations would have permitted the completion of the works by 1904. As it turned out, however, they were not half finished by that date. It was estimated in the beginning that the cost of the fortifications would be 8,927,775 roubles but this turned out to be entirely too small and that the amount should have been 15,000,000. By the end of 1903 a little less than one-third this amount had been appropriated and of the latter more than

500,000 had been diverted in 1900 to build batteries not connected with the Kwangtung project but on account of the Boxer war. The Minister of Finance constantly endeavored to cut down the amounts authorized and the Secretary of War found it necessary to limit the Engineer Department.

No money ever became available for Kinchou and that point was just as received from China in 1897, although all persons and commissions had reported upon the importance of this place in the system of fortifications for the peninsula.

Further lack of money caused the designer, with the permission of the highest authorities, to make certain economical deviations from the regular rules by cutting down the proper thickness of concrete arches and walls which, as became evident later, fatally affected the successful defense of the place.

Thus it may be observed that competent officers made thorough and careful study on the ground of the requirements of the case and reported upon the cost of suitable fortifications. These reports, for reasons already given, were cut down almost fifty per cent and approved by heads of departments who could not possibly see any but the economic phase of the question. Thus in the first effort to prepare the port as a suitable base for the fleet the initial mistake in policy was made.

After having accepted a plan for the defense of the Kwangtung, money was so limited and so slow in coming that the works were scarcely one-third completed when the crisis came.

The scheme would have worked very well had the war not arrived but the deficiencies were not corrected before 1903 when it became evident that war with Japan was coming, and, at times, might be said to be imminent. The war cloud had always been above the horizon since 1898, and it is almost beyond belief that such neglect and such false economy could be advocated and enforced in the face of such a situation.

In commenting on this question Colonel Velicho said:

It is impossible to decide defense questions wisely when your superiors say to you "this city is very important and we shall assign a garrison of 25,000 men. That port is less important and we shall assign only 8000 men to defend it. Construct a fortress to fit a garrison of 8000 men."

The line of main defense was to be divided into two parts by the Lunho.

1. The east front ran from the Kreutzberg to the Lunho, a distance of 8.5 kilometers.

2. The west front from the Lunho to include White Wolf Mountain, a distance of 12 kilometers.

This necessitated the omission of Takushan, etc., from the line of main defense, which on account of its importance was to be prepared first, and forced the hills in front into a secondary line. Takushan and Siagushan should have been prepared as early as possible but as it turned out they were not prepared when the attack came and were of no use in the defense.

While money was not available for the completion of the defenses about 20,000,000 roubles had been spent on works, docks, etc., at Dalni, where a commercial station and harbor had been established during the same period. This expenditure made at the sacrifice of the defense was a serious mistake in view of the constant danger of war to which Russia was then exposed, and was a second mistake in policy.

Importance of Kinchou

The important position of Kinchou was not considered at all in the appropriations. This was known to be the key of the defenses to the peninsula and had been fully considered by those who had studied the subject. Colonel Velicho found certain contradictions in his instructions. He was directed to devise a scheme for the defense of the peninsula and at the same time was obliged to limit the same to a garrison of 11,300 men. This was impossible. The fortress was fortunate in having soon after the beginning of the war in all more than 50,000 men available for its defense.

Underestimation of the Enemy, and Power of Future Ordnance

In working the details of the defenses, Colonel Velicho further says:

It is difficult to estimate what siege artillery the Japanese may bring against this fortress in a siege.

As in 1894 they had at their disposal a siege park of some 30 guns, among which were 12-cm. guns and 15-cm. mortars, so, at the least, foresight would demand that in future he should count on at least double that number of those guns. Finally, he estimated that the enemy would have in all 184 guns of which 144 would be field and 40 would be siege guns. On the strength of these conclusions he reduced the thickness of the concrete walls below that demanded by the rules in such cases.

Economic considerations demanded the reduction of the space of the casemates and the heights and thicknesses of the parapets and arches, to what might seem allowable in view of the weak siege artillery which would be opposed to them. The erroneous deductions made in the premises are now apparent from the numbers of 6-inch guns, 8-inch howitzers, 11-inch mortars and long range 6-inch naval guns placed before the works and the preparation of a siege park of 300 guns to reduce the works after the failure of the first general assault. Thus in the fall of Port Arthur we obtain a clear idea of what *economy* did for Russia.

Under the conditions in 1903 and the certainty that war with Japan was imminent, the opinions of the special board became considerably modified. In 1903 Alexieff, commander of the forces of the Kwangtung, had gotten up a memoir stating the necessities and requirements of Port Arthur which he handed to the Minister of War. This contained but few items relating to the development and execution of the defenses and none touching upon hastening the progress of the same. Thus with diplomatic relations with Japan seriously strained in 1903, a rupture possible at any moment, and the situation becoming more and more serious, progress upon the fortifications was practically ignored.

Organization of the Command

In the fall of 1903 the first serious effort to organize the command of the fortress was made, and consisted in the following steps.

1. The appointment of Admiral Alexieff as Viceroy.
2. The organization at Port Arthur of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Brigade of four regiments, the assignment of Major-General Kondratenko to command the same, and the designation of this force as the garrison.
3. The reorganization of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Brigade and increase of the regiments from two to three battalions.
4. The organization of the 7th Rifle Artillery Detachment of three batteries of eight guns each.
5. The organization of the 4th Rifle Artillery Brigade, of four batteries of eight guns each.
6. The organization of a reserve battery of six 67-mm. guns.

7. The organization of a third battalion of fortress artillery, which reached Port Arthur on March 6th, 1904.

8. The organization of one company each, of fortress mine, telegraph, gendarme and fire department first class. The latter was not finally organized for lack of the proper fire apparatus.

9. The appointment of a fortress commander, formation of a fortress staff, and fortress administration. By orders of superior authority, Lieutenant-General Stoessel was designated Fortress Commander.

10. For contingencies, 3,000,000 roubles were allotted to the Viceroy. This money might have been used for hastening the construction of the fortifications, but it became available only one month before the war and was too late to accomplish important results.

Due to these late efforts to organize the fortress, it was not sufficiently strengthened and in full running order at the commencement of the war.

A memorial was gotten up December 13, 1903, concerning the military preparedness of the fortress. There were but immaterial changes in the conditions in the place between this date and the beginning of the war. The object of this memoir was to show the defensibility of the fortress, because in the newly organized fortress staff no plan of defense or mobilization existed and no records or papers were on file from which such plans could be made.

The memoir lays particular stress on the important deficiencies. The fortress commander had no influence on the progress of the defensive works since the engineer authorities were directly under the charge of the Chief Engineer of the District of Kwangtung. A fortress engineer administration was organized after the beginning of the war.

The above mentioned memoir deals first with the fortress fortifications.

Engineer Administration

The coast front.—Considers the number of batteries and their positions along the sea front.

The land front.—Deals with the fortifications, completed, not completed, just begun, not begun, Chinese fortifications, etc.

Artillery Administration

Guns.—The number of coast guns was fixed at 124. The number for the land defense at 418 field and heavier guns, and 48 machine guns. At the beginning of the war the fortress had received of these 131 coast guns, 244 land defense, and 38 machine guns. On February 8th there were more coast guns than the original number allotted thereto, but they were short five 25-cm. guns. At this date 116 were mounted: 108 on the sea front and 8 on the land front. Later, in addition to these, about 100 old Chinese guns were mounted. During the course of the siege a large number of ships' guns were taken from the fleet and mounted on the land fronts.

Ammunition.—The number of rounds for the guns was the authorized amount. In many cases there were even more on hand. On February 8th the Russians began to transfer ammunition from the storage magazines to those of the batteries, where up to this time there had been but little since the magazines were just being completed.

Searchlights.—There were in all five searchlights in the place, three had already been erected in the coast defenses and the remaining two were to be placed in the land defenses.

Rifles and Rifle Ammunition.—There were in reserve 9269 rifles, and a liberal supply of cartridges. The total on hand was 31,904,000, or approximately 1000 per rifle.

Plan of Mobilization.—Of the several fortress administrations the artillery was the only one that had a prepared plan for bringing the place up to a defensive condition. This was due to the fact that the administration of the Fortress Artillery of the Kwangtung had already been in existence for four years, whereas the fortress itself had been organized just before the war.

In this respect it appears that no anticipation of the requirements of the fortress about to come into existence had been attempted and no thought given to the many complex questions demanding immediate solution that are certain to arise in such cases and did arise here after the fortress came into existence.

Commissariat and Medical Administration

The fortress commissariat had been organized on the 16th of December. It had, however, taken no steps with respect to the troops until after the departure of the Intendant of the

Kwangtung District from Port Arthur on February 16th, 1904. On the 8th a list of commissary stores and forage indicates a fair supply of rations, but reports tend to show, and in several cases do show, that no particular care was exercised to collect a suitable supply of the same in anticipation of a long and severe siege.

The medical administration and plan of mobilization of sanitary troops had not been developed and appears to have remained incomplete throughout the siege.

Troops of the Fortress

The 3rd East Siberian Brigade and Rifle Artillery Detachment, which, since the day of occupation had constituted the garrison of Kwangtung and were well acquainted with the country, were withdrawn at the end of January to South Manchuria in obedience to orders of the Viceroy, who thought it important to have troops at the Yalu before the Japanese should arrive. These troops were therefore sent to Liaoyang and Kaiping to be convenient for the above transfer to the Yalu when desirable. A company of sappers was also ordered from the place, leaving the same without sappers for several weeks. Thus on February the 8th, of the 24,550 men in Port Arthur 5250 were under orders to march to other points.

The fortress system of telegraph and telephone lines had not been installed and no progress was being made in installing them. The telegraph company in the place had actually marched away on February 23. It was not till April 9, that the Port Arthur Fortress War Telegraph Company arrived and took up this work. The installation was hastily put in. As a rule the lines were put on poles or lightly buried, and were continuously cut by hostile shot during the siege, causing much annoyance and contributing to the downfall of the place.

Although the fortress commander had been appointed on the 24th of August, 1903, no instructions had reached him by the beginning of the war. No plans of defense and mobilization existed and without them and with the existing incomplete organization of the fortress, it was considered impossible to get up such plans in the three or four months available.

At the beginning of war, therefore, the fortress was not ready, and the organization and administration of the fortress were not in operation according to regulations. When hostilities began Lieutenant-General Wolkow, who was the only person who had had opportunities to become acquainted with

the situation, was ordered to Harbin to command the rear of the army.

At Kinchou nothing was done to prepare the place until after the outbreak of war. The delay caused a feverish rush of work accompanied by many doubts as to the possibility of preparing the place within the time available.

The bays and places of lookout in the neighborhood of Port Arthur were provided with observing detachments and all stations connected with the fortress by telephone. The more distant points were neglected for the time or dependence placed upon other means to secure information.

On February 6th the Viceroy received a reply to a telegram which he had sent to St. Petersburg, in which he was authorized by supreme authority to use his discretion (1) in ordering the mobilization of the troops of his district, (2) in declaring a state of war at the time of mobilization, (3) in declaring a state of war over and in the fortress of Port Arthur and the Chinese railway. On the same day the Viceroy ordered the commanding officer of the Kwangtung to take proper measures to strengthen the safety of Port Arthur, by increasing the number of observing stations towards the sea, guarding points containing magazines, storehouses, depots, etc., and establishing batteries at the entrance to the harbor. The commandant of the fortress, on receipt of these instructions, issued an order covering the main subjects but most of these directions were of such nature that they could not be carried out immediately—such as construction of booms across the harbor, placing siege batteries at the entrance, etc.

Rupture of Diplomatic Relations

On February 6th, 4 P. M., St. Petersburg time, diplomatic relations were broken off and this fact was known to the Viceroy and the circle about him but neither the fortress commander nor the other commanders had been notified of the fact. A meeting of the officers had been set for February 9th but they learned of the state of hostility through the attack upon the harbor on the preceding night.

Preparations for Defense

On January 31st Admiral Starck, commander of the Pacific Squadron, issued instructions for the patrol of the waters adjacent to the harbor by torpedo-boats and cruisers, and for use of searchlights and signals at night after which

communication with the ships was to be cut off and the same placed in readiness for instant defense. He further requested the Viceroy for two swift cruisers to make certain defined trips to the Clifford Islands and the Shantung Peninsula and to act as scouts for the fleet. The Admiral appeared to have rather clear ideas of the requirements of the problem before him and his duty in reference to the security of the Squadron. The Viceroy allowed him one swift cruiser.

On the first and subsequent attacks by the Japanese the Russians mistook the Japanese torpedoboats for their own, and appeared to be unfamiliar with the appearance of their own boats and certainly were unfamiliar with those of the enemy.

For a long time the troops of the garrison had been assigned to particular posts and duties, but the changes in stations of troops, ordered about this time and then in the process of execution, had prevented the assignments of the new troops to their proper places. On the morning after the attack, orders were issued for the troops to man the land fronts. The troops took up their positions in haste and got them in order. They particularly rushed the work of the fortress artillery which was to operate on the land front.

The administrative staff were rapidly getting their affairs in order and preparing to go to Harbin. Nervousness and restlessness were everywhere noticeable. It was increased by the over-supply of staffs and higher officers. During this time there were the Viceroy; the Commander of the troops, General Wolkow; the commandant of the fortress, General Stoessel; the staffs of the Viceroy, the District, and of the Fortress Commandant; and to these must be added the Chief and staffs of the Squadron, the Harbor Commandant, and the navy staff of the Viceroy. From all sides the troops received orders and directions, often in flat contradiction to one another.

On the 9th of February the Viceroy acted upon the instructions of the 6th and declaring the fortress to be in a state of siege ordered the mobilization within the Amur District and turned over the defense of Kinchou-Port Arthur District to the Commandant of the Fortress, extending his authority over the whole.

During the next five days the most incredible rumors were afloat and had a bad effect upon all concerned. "The Commanding Officer informs the garrison that tonight a bombardment may be expected" is a specimen of orders pub-

lished during this period. Such information or rather misinformation was not only useless but injurious to the garrison.

Although there existed a mobilization plan for the Kwangtung District there had been so many changes of troops recently that it was of no use in the emergency. No one knew whence were to come the regiments that were to replace those which had been ordered away.

Plan of Defense

The preparation of the fortified trenches went on rapidly. This duty was turned over by Stoessel to the able and energetic Kondratenko, and to his astounding power for work the extensive results were due. He took up the work of completing unfinished works, constructing new ones, and the supporting defenses, putting old Chinese works into defensive condition, completing the surrounding wall, building the approaches, clearing the ground, placing mines and obstacles, and laying out new and improving old telegraph lines.

At the same time work on Kinchou under Colonel Tretjakow and Captain Von Schwartz was being pushed with energy.

Orders for defense were prepared as follows:

1. Holding of neighboring bays, observation of the coast of Korea north of Kinchou, and keeping up communications with the other troops at Dalni and other neighboring places were directed. The net-work of places was extended and the communication system connected from Dalni to Port Arthur.

2. Attention was given to Kinchou.

3. A rear admiral was detailed as aide to the Fortress Commandant, and the coast defenses, as well as the ships not belonging to the Squadron, were put under his charge.

4. Provisions were made for a vessel to be always on duty to defend the entrance to the harbor and arrangements for suitable signals, etc., for co-operation with the shore batteries were made. Guns from the *Angara* were taken off and placed on each side of the entrance.

5. A large number of small caliber guns were taken from the ships and mounted on shore.

6. Several of the guns mentioned were placed to cover Pigeon Bay and other bays, and manned by sailors, thereby improving the service of the stations of observation.

7. Mines were to be planted in Kerr and Talienwan Bays

and careful observation of the coast of Korea with special reference to a large expedition which had sailed from Japan.

In addition to these instructions the following were also issued: For the formation of a volunteer "Druschine," exclusion of all Japanese, arming of civilians, instructing the officers and men "Never to give up the Fort," destruction of the docks at Dalni, and the formation of detachments of mounted scouts.

On the 17th of February General Wolkow and his staff left Port Arthur and with him departed the District Staff, the Intendant, Engineer, Artillery and Medical Administrations, leaving General Stoessel to command the Fortress and the District.

Arrival of Admiral Makaroff

On the 8th of March Admiral Makaroff, the new commander of the fleet, arrived. His arrival had been awaited with anxiety. He took the squadron to sea on March the 11th and put it through a series of maneuvers and returned to the harbor in the evening. At a meeting of the Fortress Commander and the three admirals, Starck, Greme, and Vitgeft, measures for the co-operation of the land forces and the fleet were considered. The result consisted in sending three detachments from the ships to shore at night to guard certain places and to be under the orders of the Commandant of the Fortress for the time, returning to the ships in the morning, and in placing two 47-mm. guns ashore.

In the mean time the Commander of the forces in Manchuria still considered the fortress as the rear and base of his army, although the place was already in a state of blockade. The Fortress Commander fought against any orders embodying this idea but for a time his protests were without effect. From the interior large parties of Japanese were sent to the place for transfer to Japan, which was very difficult. Also the sick from the field army were sent to the place and demands made for all kinds of supplies. Finally ammunition, guns and men were taken away. In March orders came to send more guns to Yinkou, the Commandant protested vigorously. Later an order was received to prepare and send away a fortress siege park consisting of 24 guns and eight machine guns with ammunition, equipment and men. The preparation thereof took so long that before it could be completed the railroad was cut and further communication with the north prevented:

In a report upon the position of Kinchou, Major-General Wasiljewski, Chief Engineer, stated as his opinion that the place would be attacked only from the north, that four battalions would be sufficient garrison, and that the position should be able to hold out for two months or until it could probably be relieved by the armies in the field.

On the 7th of March there were mounted on the land front 233 guns ready to fire, and guns and ammunition were beginning to arrive from Russia. The artillery work was making great progress.

The Intendant administration of the District left the place without concerning itself in the least as to the condition of affairs therein. The new administration sought to obtain cattle by purchase and ship same by rail from Manchuria, but this method entailed great difficulties and terminated without favorable results.

The Arrival of Lieutenant-General Smirnoff

On March 17, Lieutenant-General Smirnoff arrived at Port Arthur. He had been appointed by order of Superior Headquarters, dated February 15, to be the new Commandant of the Fortress and was to relieve Stoessel, who was to command the 3rd Siberian Corps.

The fleet since the arrival of Admiral Makaroff, had greatly improved. A Japanese naval officer wrote in his notebook in regard to him:

With the arrival of Admiral Makaroff an unheard of animation has taken place in the Russian fleet, that is particularly noticed in the defense of the harbor. He must be a man of ability.

On March 23, an order was issued from Superior Headquarters directing that:

The Commander of the 3rd Siberian Corps, Lieutenant-General Stoessel, will assume direction of the defense of the fortified zone of Port Arthur-Kinchou, having under his direction the Commandant of Port Arthur and all of the troops within the above mentioned zone.

At the same time authority was given to the Viceroy to arrange the service conditions of different commands more in detail and on the 27th of March he issued the following order, by telegraph, from Mukden:

In accordance with directions from superior authority your Excellency will take over the control of the land defense of the fortified zone of Kwangtung, by virtue of which the Commandant of the Fortress of Port Arthur is put under your orders. By virtue of supreme authority given

me I entrust you with the rights of a Commanding General of an Independent Army Corps under full control of the Commander in Chief of the Manchurian Army. To the Commandant of the Fortress I here give the authority of a Commanding General of an Army Corps not independent. In so far as I give you instructions, I ask that in defense of the command entrusted to you you will arrive at some understanding with the Chief of the Fleet.

During the first half of the month of April the mine company was engaged in laying electrically controlled mines in the harbor.

Admiral Makaroff directed a cruiser with several torpedo-boats to take up position nightly in rear of the mine fields. At the appearance of hostile blockading ships or torpedoboats, on a designated signal they were to go out and engage the same. The Admiral himself, as a rule, slept on the cruiser watching the mine fields.

On the night of April 12-13 the harbor was threatened. Next morning the Admiral with the fleet went out against three hostile cruisers, which evidently were endeavoring to entice the fleet away from the port. On the appearance on the horizon of eight hostile ships the Admiral turned about and led the squadron back to the harbor, the *Petropavlovsk* with the Chief in the lead. At about half past nine in the morning when this ship was in the outer roadstead, at a distance of five or six miles from the shore, it struck a mine and immediately after a second mine. It rapidly sank, and Makaroff and his staff—made up of the best officers of the fleet—were lost.

Soon after his arrival in Port Arthur, Admiral Makaroff had sent a report to the Viceroy in which he attempted to show that in a maritime fortress unity of command was absolutely imperative and at the same time asked that the Fortress Commandant should be under the control of the Chief of the Fleet and required to carry out all of his directions.

The Viceroy fully agreed with these proposals and had already made arrangements to have the Fortress Commandant subordinate to the Chief of the Fleet. Before issuing the order, however, he telegraphed to General Kuropatkin for his opinion in the matter. In his telegram he stated that:

To avoid a double command the subordination of the Fortress Commandant to the Commander in Chief of the Manchurian Army is required to be given up. The connection between that army and the fortified zone is already very weak.

General Kuropatkin was in no way in agreement with

this view of the Viceroy and Admiral Makaroff. In a telegram to the Viceroy on March the 13th, amongst other things he said the following:

Admiral Makaroff must, if he wishes to command troops in battle on land, first learn to direct operations on land. The rights and duties of the Fortress Commandant are directly laid down in *Orders for the Administration of a Fortress* and I see no reason, in view of the fact that these orders were approved by the highest authority in 1901, why as soon as they are, for the first time called into use in earnest, they should again be changed.

Inasmuch as I have fully and openly stated my view on this most important question, I must give as fully my opinions as to the impracticability of turning the defense of the fortress over to General Smirnof, who is entirely unacquainted with the theater of war and the troops and who in no way possesses experience in war and in authority.

As Commandant of the Fortress, and the fortified zone up to the Isthmus at Kinchou, General Stoessel is named, and subordinate to him will remain all power and means for the defense on land.

As a result of this difference of opinion between the Viceroy and General Kuropatkin, already at that time detailed to command the Army of Manchuria, the question as to subordination of the Fortress Commandant of Port Arthur under the Chief of the Fleet was laid before the highest authority and the result was the receipt of the telegram already quoted of March the 23rd, which assigned Stoessel as Commander of the District with the Fortress Commandant subordinate to him.

The Armament of the Fortress Artillery

The supply of projectiles for the great number of guns of the fortress was a serious matter. On request for same by the Chief of Artillery of the fortress, Major General Bjely, the Artillery Headquarters in St. Petersburg replied by telegraph about the middle of March.

As to sending the 25-cm. shot and shell for the Canet guns you can not reckon on it in the near future since such projectiles are not on hand.

The Commandant made a report upon the subject on March 31st asking that the projectiles be furnished as soon as possible, but the report had no effect since none were available.

The seacoast 25-cm. armor-piercing shells were not charged with high-explosive, as were those for the fleet, and to remedy this deficiency Admiral Makaroff directed that a number of 25-cm. shells be turned over to the seacoast artillery and telegraphed his action to the head of the Navy Department at St. Petersburg.

On the 27th of March Admiral Makaroff received a reply to this message informing him that Artillery Headquarters had reached the following decisions:

1. Armor-piercing shells for the 25-cm. guns are not to be charged with high-explosive, as up to this time there is no method of doing so that does not decrease penetration.
2. As a maximum range for armor-piercing shell may be regarded as 3.2 kilometers, all firing beyond this range with this ammunition is useless.
3. Firing at a moving fleet beyond 10 kilometers is not worth while. On account of the low probability of hitting such firing gives poor results considering the ammunition expended, the supply of which is limited. It also causes useless deterioration of the guns.

This message caused the assembling of a special board consisting of Vice Admiral Makaroff, General Stoessel, Lieutenant-General Smirnoff, Major-General Bjely (Chief of Artillery), and the Grand Duke Cyrill Vladimirowitsch. A collective telegram was sent to the head of the Navy Department, in substance as follows:

The decisions of Artillery Headquarters were the cause of a special meeting of the undersigned. They have come to the conclusion that the Artillery Headquarters has not gone into the subject with sufficient detail, or otherwise it would not have directed that no reply be made to the fire of the enemy who is firing and destroying the fleet and batteries. The undersigned consider it absolutely necessary that the coast guns, even in the face of theoretical deductions of the Artillery Headquarters, be supplied with projectiles and be permitted to fire at those ranges which the ballistic properties of the gun permit.

This ended the matter—projectiles were not sent for the batteries and the ships furnished the batteries with armor-piercing shells.

In the meantime the authorities in the fortress worked upon the fortifications, and great strides were made in that respect; the artillery work went on; the ships were being repaired as rapidly as possible but progress was hindered by the lack of a dock for this purpose and they were repaired by means of caissons, which caused delay. It must be said in general that during the time of Admiral Makaroff that all naval personnel worked with its whole soul to aid in the defense. The work was done in common and there were no conflicts between the land and naval forces.

Arrival of the Viceroy

On April the 15th the Viceroy returned to Port Arthur and in accordance with superior orders took over command of the Fleet. On April 25th he received through his military chief

of staff, information from the staff of St. Petersburg concerning an expedition that had left Japan. The message read as follows:

Telegrams from Cheefoo say that rumors in regard to landings at Dagschan, Yinkou, and Kaiping are false reports, and that the real attack of the Second Army that left Japan on April 16, will take place at Talienwan, Kinchou, against Port Arthur. The Japanese have an intermediate base at the Viatautau Islands. For the attack upon Port Arthur, mortars are being shipped from Japan.

As to the measures to be taken to resist the Japanese landings on the Liaotung Peninsula ideas of the higher commanders differed and nothing was done in advance to reconcile this difference.

On the 4th day of May it was evident that the Japanese were preparing to land in the neighborhood of Pitsewo, and the Viceroy prepared to leave Port Arthur. In the mean time he sent out small parties with definite instructions to prevent landings of small parties and to delay large ones. Under the circumstances it was evident the task was far beyond the strength of the bodies sent out and they had no influence on the result.

Questions as to Authority of Fortress Commander

At the end of April, hardly a month after the appointment of General Stoessel as Commandant of the Fortified Zone, *misunderstandings arose as to the administration of the fortress*. In orders appointing him, the Viceroy gave to him the rights of a commander of an independent army corps, and to the fortress commander the rights of a commander of a corps not independent. These orders violated the *Orders for the Administration of Fortresses* and curtailed the rights of fortress commanders but said nothing as to the changes or curtailments of said rights, or the duties or limitations of these two commanders.

Nowhere was to be found a definite order that clearly specified the spheres of usefulness of the Commandant of the Fortified Zone. Stoessel was of the opinion that he was the sole and principal commandant not only in the zone but in the fortress. The Fortress Commandant did not know in which direction his authority as Commandant of the Fortress was curtailed. Finally the officers of the two staffs were uncertain in how far the orders of one or the other were to be carried out. On the 27th of April the Viceroy issued an order for the

“Organization and Regulation of the Forces in the Fortress of Port Arthur,” in which the following were to be rigidly carried out:

1. The internal police administration of the fortress and, as specified, a portion of the zone is placed under the direction of the Commandant of the Fortress. For this purpose, the local administration, the town police, and the heads of the boundary guards shall be under his orders and carry out all of his instructions.

2. The retention or exclusion of persons from the town and fortified district is in his hands exclusively.

3. He alone has authority to permit or restrict persons from leaving the town.

4. He is authorized to control the withdrawal of supplies from the fortified zone.

5. He has full power and authority over the general sanitary conditions of the town.

6. He has control over the prices of the necessities of life within the fortress.

These orders did not accomplish the purpose for which they were issued since they do not contain one word regulating the rights of the Commandant of the Fortress, in a military sense, or the demarcation of the powers of the Commandants of the Fortress and the Fortified Zone. In these regulations issued for the purpose of defining the powers of the commandants of the fortress and the fortified zone, no mention is made of the latter, and Stoessel assumed that this order did not concern him at all, but was issued for the purpose of defining the sphere of action of the Fortress Commandant more clearly. At the same time he was the senior and of the opinion that all the rights of the commandant belonged to him as Commandant of the Fortified Zone; for the power belonging to the junior must also come entirely to the senior.

This General Stoessel stated in a letter to General Smirnoff as his understanding of the order of the Viceroy. Thus the main object of the order was lost, and the differences still existing between the two men was one of the causes that severed the good relations between them and later led to more serious trouble.

On the 15th of April the Viceroy ordered 188 guns to be taken from the ships and mounted on shore. The removal of the guns caused considerable excitement on board the ships. A large number of projectiles were disembarked with the guns.

Although the operations at the time of, and subsequent to, the landing of the enemy near Pitsewo were known, a

short remark here will cast a side light upon the subject in issue.

The disembarkation of the Second Japanese Army was carried out with wonderful energy although it was done in spite of unfavorable circumstances. According to the Chinese, 10,000 were landed on May 5. A battalion with pioneers set out at 4 A. M. on the 5th to go to Pitsewo and cut the telegraph lines, and at 9 P. M. two companies with pioneers to destroy the railway at Pulientien which they reached next morning. In the mean time the Russians had lost all touch with the enemy. These parties and the main landing were not interfered with although it was known on the 4th that a landing would take place there and Stoessel had approximately 20,000 men in that neighborhood who were available for energetic action against the enemy while getting ashore. A typhoon raged on the 6th and continued for two or three days necessitating cessation of the landing movement for at least one day. General Fock was in command of these troops and never at any time took active measures in sufficient numbers to accomplish anything or to interfere with the Japanese procedure. *Inefficiency of the highest order appears to have prevailed here.*

The Departure of the Viceroy

The Viceroy left for Mukden on May 5th. On his way from Port Arthur he telegraphed Stoessel on the 6th. Amongst other things he stated:

I consider it necessary to inform General Fock that his main task does not consist in holding fast this position (Kinchou) at any price, but consists in timely withdrawal of the troops entrusted to him to reinforce the garrison at Port Arthur.

Battle of Kinchou

Except to carry out the earlier directions of the Viceroy, Stoessel took no steps on May 5th to prevent a landing of the enemy, or even to secure accurate information thereof. During the period from the landing at Pitsewo until the battle of Kinchou the inactivity of the Russian fleet and of the land forces under Fock is incredible. The fleet did nothing, did not even attempt anything, and the land forces made no reconnaissance of any value and after a few hours contact with the Japanese lost all touch with them and were in complete ignorance of their numbers or movements.

During the campaign from Pitsewo, Russian commanders

scarcely ever issued any orders and much confusion was the result and it is not improbable that had suitable orders been issued at Kinchou, the result of the battle might have been different. Stoessel never issued orders except as to some small unimportant detail of routine nature. Generally he discussed tactical questions after the event; and after stating his own opinions in hazy generalities, would approve Fock's propositions to retreat, which the latter presented to him as an urgent necessity. Neither of these men seemed to have any definite idea of the real situation and hesitation and uncertainty with changes in lines of action at critical times are characteristic. Fock always had a horror of using his men and spent most of his time looking for places in the rear upon which to fall back or to provide for some contingency which might form an excuse for retirement. Although these actions were scarcely ever in harmony with Stoessel's ideas he approved Fock's procedure and recommended him on several occasions for decorations, promotion, or other substantial rewards. Neither of these men had stomachs for real fighting and they never indulged in the same if it were possible to avoid it no matter what might be the object to be gained. None of the records show that either of them was at any time during the siege present where his own skin might be in serious danger. This became more apparent as the siege developed and their characters became better known. On the 21st of August, Fock, who was in command of the general reserve, received directions from Smirnoff to send two battalions to the eastern front but he failed to do so and in fact refused until the latter wrote him a positive order to comply, with a statement as to what would happen in case of further delay. When his last organization was ordered forward Fock did not accompany the same. For these offenses Smirnoff relieved him from all command and never assigned him to one again. When Kondratenko was killed Fock was assigned by Stoessel to the command of the land defenses, in spite of Smirnoff's representations. The effect of this last action was very soon apparent in reductions in garrisons of hard pressed forts, evacuations by order of Fock in spite of the opposition of the fort commanders and many other actions which rapidly brought the fortress to a condition that appeared to indicate that surrender could not be further delayed.

The following telegram to Fock illustrates Stoessel's ideas and instructions:

As to the south of Kinchou no disembarkation has taken place, and as no preparations for this purpose are observed, an attack upon Kinchou is only to be looked for from the north or more properly from the northeast; if a landing in our rear does not take place, you have to concern yourself with the strongest defense of the position. The reserves for the position must be reinforced, one regiment is not enough. As long as Kinchou is ours, Port Arthur is in no danger. For the protection of Yintschentsce Bay I will take the necessary measures from here.

This telegram while a little verbose and stating self-evident facts does assign to Fock a definite mission, and assures him that he need not worry about his rear which will be taken care of by the Commanding General himself, and that the one problem for him is to offer the strongest resistance at Kinchou. As to how well Fock heeded these instructions is shown by the following action. He had a command of approximately 16,000 men to defend Kinchou. He placed one regiment and two companies and four scout detachments in the works, retained nearly 13,000 men in a general reserve to cover the anticipated retreat of the Kinchou garrison, and would not permit any of the reserve to support the troops in the position. The reserve was kept about ten kilometers in rear of the trenches and covered an area about ten kilometers deep by fifteen wide. Having, in spite of his instructions, made these dispositions, he went twenty-five kilometers to the rear to look for possible landings of the enemy, and to select a place for resistance in case a retreat should become necessary.

For the distinguished service rendered in this connection, Stoessel recommended him for rewards as follows:

I would ask that General Fock, besides being promoted to the next grade for which I have already recommended him, be also given the order of St. George, III Class. This will be a great reward for the old soldier.

The report of the Russian General Staff shows that General Kuropatkin's letters to Stoessel prove clearly that Kuropatkin did not understand the defensive requirements of the position of Kinchou, or the circumstances of the situation. Thus in a letter containing other matter he says:

According to my opinion it is important that the troops of General Fock be withdrawn at the proper time, rejoining the garrison at Port Arthur. It seems to me very desirable that the guns of the position of Kinchou be dismantled at the proper time, and sent back by rail to Port Arthur, otherwise these forty guns will become trophies which will have a very depressing effect.

The question of reinforcing the Russian flanks by the fleet had often been suggested by General Stoessel, but the only result at Kinchou was that the gunboat *Bobr* and torpedo-boats *Briki* and *Burny* were sent to Talienwan Bay. The *Bobr* did excellent work in connection with the battle.

None of the 13,000 reserve was used to check the retreat of the Russians at Kinchou, which by many authorities has been characterized as disgraceful. The army was badly demoralized, as shown by a false alarm about midnight following the battle. A shout "The Japanese cavalry" caused a stampede at Perepljotny, and much excitement, confusion, and a number of casualties were the result.

The Russian General Staff reporting on the outcome of this battle closes with the following emphasized comment:

Thus, thanks to the carelessness and to the defective orders of our leaders, the victory was given to the Japanese.

After the battle General Stoessel sent reports of preceding events on May 26, 27th, two on the 28th, and the last one on May 30th. In all of these reports we see apprehension as to the future and strong cries for help. In the first he writes "quick and strong help is absolutely necessary." In the 3rd he writes the same, and in the 5th unless we find "Immediate and strong help, consisting of not less than three Divisions and a Cavalry Division, it may be too late; here ends everything." In these reports we find such expressions as "we will fight to the last," "As long as we hold these advanced positions Port Arthur is not besieged," etc. In reports two and five are found renewals of the recommendations referring to Fock and Nadejin for rewards. The renewal of the recommendation of the reward of St. George's Cross after the Battle of Kinchou is astonishing and shows that he either did not know enough about the matter to pass upon the merits of the case or made his recommendations with corrupt motive.

Considerations as to Mission of Fortress and Fleet

Requests were again made to the fleet commander to support the flanks of the army but Admiral Vitgeft demurred and finally agreed to send out some gunboats for that purpose. A little later General Stoessel insisted that the squadron should put to sea. There existed good reasons for not going out at that particular time, in the opinion of the Admiral and for the time the fleet remained inside the harbor.

After a meeting in which naval and military officers considered the question, Stoessel took up the question with higher authority, and finally received the following definite instructions from the Viceroy, stating in clear language basic principles governing the case.

1. The fortress is to be energetically defended in order to serve to the last as a place of protection to the fleet.

2. The fleet is under the absolute control of the Chief of the Fleet, for which reason its departure from the harbor is to take place in accordance with Admiral Vitgeft's judgment.

3. Your duty, as superior military commander, consists in your making use, to the utmost, of all the resources of an obstinate defense of the fortress, and under no circumstances will it be assumed that to save the fortress the fleet is to be sacrificed.

On June 13, Stoessel received two telegrams delivered via Cheefoo, carried by a junk. The first referred to the equipment of the fortress and its food supply and adds that relief will follow and finishes with these words:

You must arm yourself with not only an unshakable firmness and courage but also with patience. An over-hasty march for your relief with insufficient forces will bring us only reverses instead of success.

Stoessel Begs for Reinforcements

The second telegram appears to be an answer to the telegram from Stoessel after the battle of Kinchou, in which he demanded immediate and strong help. In the beginning of the message General Kuropatkin says:

A year ago you declared to me with pride and courage on the walls of the fortifications of Port Arthur, which then were not nearly so strong as today, that Port Arthur would stand the attack of the whole Japanese Army. Today, however, you report that the fortress demands immediate and strong help. Such declaration is, however, only proper when the commandant and the troops of a fortress have fulfilled their duty to their Czar and country; have held back for a long time overwhelming numbers of the enemy; have caused him severe losses; and have exhausted their ammunition and their food supply. Such declarations from you at this time show me that you have lost faith in the impregnability of the fortress; this is highly dangerous, because such a loss of faith of the supreme military commander in the bravery of his troops and the strength of the fortifications can easily spread to those under him. I explain your demoralization only by a momentary indisposition.

In a more favorable condition than Port Arthur a fortress can hardly find itself. You have at your disposal over 27 excellent rifle battalions, several naval battalions, and an armed militia whose entire strength exceeds four Japanese divisions. Their divisions have less strength than ours. You will have during the first part an opponent about equal to your own strength, for they must always have a strong force to cover them from

the north. However, if the Japanese bring six divisions against you, you will have two defenders against three attackers. At Tieurentschin one fought against five and at Kinchou the 5th Regiment engaged twelve Japanese regiments and then only retreated by order. Answer the Japanese with energy and courage, attack them unexpectedly at night and remember that they do not like the bayonet. *Give yourself, where it is demanded, example of personal courage*; with such helpers as Smirnoff, Fock, Kondratenko, and Nadejin, you will work wonders. Take care that everyone from the lowest to the highest is animated with a strong will to conquer or to die, then the complete victory which Russia needs will surely be ours. I have sent forward a strong detachment towards Vafangou, and will soon advance again.

To the second telegram Stoessel replied:

I report frequently as to the condition of the troops. I wish to call attention to the fact that I, like the troops, am animated with courage, and that we are maintaining ourselves on the advanced positions and do not let the enemy approach Port Arthur. I am not only not depressed but animate the spirits of all. I am, God be thanked, in good health. I asked for prompt help considering the time and distance. I am firm and keep up the spirits of the troops. You have gotten an entirely false picture of my reports. If I brought out the necessity for immediate reinforcements, I naturally did not expect, considering the time and distance, that they would come at once but only called attention to the tremendous significance of Port Arthur and that the Japanese had picked it as their principal point of combat for their operations.

The situation of the Japanese on the Kwangtung Peninsula in the beginning of June was highly favorable to the Russians; who in no way took advantage of the same; on the contrary, General Stoessel was in constant dread of the enemy taking the offensive.

The report of General Stoessel wherein he had requested strong and early reinforcements for Port Arthur had not, for the time, made a very good impression on the Commander in Chief, and all the more was this impression emphasized by the fact that the Viceroy was thereby influenced to insist on promptly sending a detachment for the relief of the place. General Kuropatkin was opposed to any movement previous to the concentration of the Manchurian Army, but saw himself forced to push Stackelberg's detachment towards the south resulting in an unsuccessful battle at Vafangou on June 13-15. In connection with this same impression the statements made in the Manchurian Army by several persons who had come from Port Arthur, including Captains Gourko and Odintzow, of the General Staff, raised doubts in his mind as to the suitableness of General Stoessel for the supreme command of the defenses of Port Arthur, and the idea to

recall him became stronger and stronger. The reasons for this step are given in detail in a letter of General Kuropatkin for the Czar on June 23rd.

It is to be regretted exceedingly that General Stoessel has not justified the hope placed in him. Personally he has lost confidence in a successful defense of the fortress, has caused this trust to waver in his subordinates, and has further expressed his doubt to the Viceroy as to the possibility of successfully defending Port Arthur stubbornly with its garrison. He has sent reports direct in which he states that the number of projectiles in the fortress is very limited and further understated the supply of stores in the place. The result of these reports, which were given credence, was the march of Stackelberg's detachment to the south without sufficient preparation.

On the 16th of June Captain Odintzow of the General Staff arrived at Kuropatkin's Headquarters from Port Arthur, sent there by Stoessel with penitent explanations that he had sent his reports too hastily, that Port Arthur requires no help and would be able to maintain itself for a long time and asked that the advance south be postponed, but it was then too late. The Viceroy on June 17, approved Kuropatkin's request that General Stoessel be recalled from Port Arthur and that he be assigned to an Army Corps. The Viceroy had already fully approved the plan of General Kuropatkin but had written to Admiral Vitgeft concerning the rumors current about Stoessel. On June 16th Vitgeft replied by telegraph:

According to my conscience I have reached the conclusion that General Stoessel does not entertain strong reliance on the means at his disposal. He changes his conclusions and his attitude very quickly, being influenced by circumstances and the personalities just then about him. His authority depends only on his rank. His entire hope for saving Port Arthur is wrapped up in the departure of the fleet.

Upon receipt of this information the Commander in Chief and the Viceroy exchanged several telegrams as to who should send General Stoessel the order of recall. Finally on June 18th General Kuropatkin sent him the following telegram:

As your command of the fortified zone is ended and you have retreated to the fortress, I ask you with the approval of the Viceroy to turn over your command of the fortress in conformity * * * , and to return to the Manchurian Army, choosing your own way, for example on a torpedoboat, where at the first opportunity you will be given command of an army corps.

The contents of this message were also sent to General Smirnoff for his information. This telegram of the 18th of

June arrived at the Staff of the Fortified Zone on the 26th and was deciphered by a General Staff officer. It was sent to General Stoessel by his Chief of Staff who was directed by Stoessel to consider the message as not received, and to keep silence as to its contents. *Thus was the telegram addressed to Smirnoff suppressed* and up to the end of the siege he knew nothing of it.

Stoessel made no reply to the first telegram from the Commander in Chief. It was only when a second telegram of the same content and a written order dated July 2, arrived, that Stoessel answered General Kuropatkin, in which he attempted to prove how necessary he was for Port Arthur, and how fatal his departure would be for the defense of the place, ending his reply:

If, however, in spite of what I say, you regard it necessary, I will consider it my duty to take all measures to carry out the order. I must, however, remark that at present all communication is made difficult by the increased vigilance as to vessels running out.

Kuropatkin left this letter unanswered, and the question of his recall was never brought up again.

Under the most urgent instructions from the Viceroy, the fleet prepared to take the sea, running out on June 23rd.

Fock's Detachment Continues its Arrangements for Retreat

The battle of Huinschan was fought on June 26, and at 7 P. M. Fock, without awaiting to clear up the situation, which was in no sense critical nor urgent, gave orders to retreat to Wolf Hills—the movement to be completed by the morning of the 27th. Fock and Stoessel were not in accord as to this move. Stoessel wished to retake Huinschan, although as was his custom he would not give an order to do so. A telegram at 1 A. M. from Stoessel to Fock stating his wishes did not cause the latter to change his mind, or his determination to withdraw. Stoessel desired to wait until morning for further information as to the advance of the enemy, and finally on the morning of the 27th the retreat was stopped by General Stoessel who had been influenced by General Kondratenko. The Japanese knew nothing of this retreat and had not observed that the positions had been abandoned; the same were re-occupied by Fock's men and held for one month longer. Stoessel's order to Fock on the morning of the 27th illumines Stoessel's indecision and shows his inability to

give definite orders. He directed him to be sure to remain on the advanced positions, but approved his arrangements for retreat.

Fock did finally halt his movement and return to the position on the morning of the 27th but it is stated that it was not due to Stoessel's orders but to the facts that the Japanese had not noticed the retreat and had not made the slightest preparation to advance.

General Fock's Secret Report Direct to General Stoessel

In reference to an attack upon redoubt No. 2 by Lieutenant Njemschenko with one company in combination with other detachments, which failed upon the night of August 29-30, and to the resulting failure, General Fock wrote a secret report although he was not on any duty connected with this or other military operations. In the report he ignored Smirnoff by whose orders the attack or sortie was made with the idea of recapturing the redoubt. In a long drawn out statement he criticises the Fortress Commandant, his own commanding officer, and comments upon the depressing effect of the losses and failure upon the command, and concludes with his opinions upon the uselessness of such attempts. He further states as his opinion that the position had no significance in the defense and that he had written to General Kondratenko to that effect in special reference to the proposed attacks on redoubts 1 and 2, set for the night of August 24-25, but postponed by the Commandant of the Fortress because it was not viewed favorably by General Kondratenko. General Stoessel issued an order in reference to this particular case and directed that in future no such attempt of assault should be repeated without his personal approval in every case.

The Russian General Staff in commenting upon the merits of the case says:

However, it must be remarked here that the small distance intervening between the redoubts held by the Japanese, the Chinese Wall, and Forts Nos. II and III, it was extremely dangerous for the fortress, and the recapture of these redoubts was a measure of extreme necessity. Had the forces required for this task and their organization been given proper attention, the results would probably have been different and would undoubtedly have had great beneficial effect upon the defense.

Stoessel Appointed Aide to the Czar

On August 30th a telegram came from the Czar appoint-

ing General Stoessel to be his Aide. This favor was given in appreciation of the repulse of the first general assault of the Japanese upon the fortress. By this appointment Stoessel's power was greatly strengthened in Port Arthur, through the moral influence of such a distinction.

On September 23, General Stoessel made a telegraphic report to the Czar of the events of the last few days. At the end of the message he said:

Ammunition I have not received; the saving of projectiles however, whose supply is becoming less, robs us of the opportunity to combat with success the artillery of the enemy and to cause assaulting columns heavy losses. The troops fought heroically. All even to the last man are impelled by a strong will to hold Russia's bulwark in the Far East to the last drop of blood. The near exhaustion of the ammunition supply, however, threatens to make all the exertions to be in vain.

On September 30 another report was sent to the Czar, the Viceroy and the Commander in Chief. He therein reports the progress of events and closes with the information "The ammunition asked for on September 23rd has not arrived."

On October 8th Stoessel ordered that owing to the nearness of the enemy's sappers to the works that sorties of small parties of from three to five men be made at night.

Council of Defense Convened on October the 29th

The condition of Forts Nos. II and III was critical. A Council of Defense was called on October 29th to consider it. General Fock was of the opinion that the place would soon be taken by assault and sought to convince General Stoessel that it was necessary to prepare the forts to be blown up. The latter directed the Commandant of the Fortress to undermine both forts as well as Intermediate Work No. 3, and Kurgan Battery, and gave orders that as soon as the enemy should enter them to blow them up without fail. The Fortress Commander made the necessary preparations at once. On Fort No. III the work was partly executed. On Fort No. II, however, at the request of the Fort Commander, it was postponed, as he was of the opinion that thereby the troops holding it would be shaken in themselves as well as in their leadership.

By November the 8th the supply of meat was completely exhausted. On the 14th there was pork and preserved meats with live stock on hand to last the whole garrison one day. Preserved meat was issued to the sick while the rest of the

troops ate horse flesh. Due to poor sustenance, several epidemics spread. During the period 14th of October to 14th of November, the sick were 51 officers and 2452 men exclusive of wounded.

Cold weather came on the 15th of November; the cold and constant work repairing damages caused General Stoessel to issue a secret order, directing that all work on the second and third lines should cease, and thus it fell out that when the first line was taken neither of the others were strong enough to make any kind of a defense.

On December the 8th General Stoessel convened the Defense Council for consideration of the general reserve which had been completely exhausted, and other matters which the loss of 203 Meter Hill had brought to the front. At the end of this meeting, Colonel Reis, Chief of Staff of the Fortified Zone, by direction of General Stoessel, brought up the question for discussion, as to how far the fortress was to be defended, that is when it had to surrender so as to save a massacre in the town and useless murder of the troops and the inhabitants.

The Fortress Commandant stated that the only measure of the length of defense of Port Arthur was the amount of stores on hand, which would last up to January 1st, 1905, in case no extraordinary events would materially change the state of affairs of the besieged fortress. The majority of the council agreed with the ideas of General Smirnoff and thought that debating the question as to the surrender of Port Arthur premature.

In the existing circumstances at Fort No. II, General Fock considered the garrison too large, and that the troops of the place should not be entirely withdrawn but the fort should be in the hands of sentinels. General Stoessel sent General Kondratenko and General Grigorenko to Fort No. II to consider the question. They came to the conclusion that:

By blowing up the hostile mine galleries under the wall of the fort that the entire front wall of the fort would be destroyed, but that the side walls would not be injured for more than 15 to 20 meters from the salients.

General Kondratenko was of the opinion that if the troops would fall back at the proper time behind the retrenchment there would be no danger except to the sentinels who would have to remain in the danger zone. These opinions were not accepted by General Stoessel, and Kondratenko was again ordered to take up the question with General Gorbatov-

ski and Lieutenant-Colonel Naumenko. General Kondratenko was killed while at this conference in a casemate in Fort No. II and the settlement of the question was left to the new commander of the land defense—General Fock—who then carried out his first idea of reducing the garrison.

Fort No. II Blown Up and Captured

At 1 P. M. on the 18th the parapet wall was blown up by the Japanese but their first assault was repulsed and the assailants driven back into the ditch. General Fock had observed the fighting at the fort from Kuropatkin Lunette and considering holding it as impossible, asked Stoessel for permission to vacate it and then reported that he had done so to General Gorbatovski. The latter did not agree with Fock as to giving up the fort and finally asked for permission to hold it until it would be found impossible to hold the parapet. General Gorbatovski then ordered the fort commander to take the parapet and informed him that he would send a company of sailors to support him. Two attempts upon the parapet failed and the Japanese began to jump over into the middle of the parade. A report of this to General Gorbatovski decided him to give up his efforts upon the parapet and hold on long enough to allow the miners to complete their work and then after leaving the place to blow it up. He then directed that intrenchments be made from the left flank of Kuropatkin Lunette to the Chinese Wall to protect the troops from the enemy in No. II, but at midnight received a message from General Fock to the effect that he did not intend to hold Kuropatkin Lunette with stronger forces than those holding it at the time.

I am in favor of reducing the force there and we shall soon have to vacate the same. An assault can always be beaten off by bringing up the reserves, and even if these do not arrive at the right time it will not be a misfortune. The main defense must be organized at the Chinese Wall in front of Battery B.

On December 22nd General Stoessel sent a telegram to General Kuropatkin as to the condition of affairs in the fortress.

My situation is very difficult: the supply of ammunition is exhausted, the number of defenders is every day less. Only a small part of the men are now healthy. The 28-cm. shells destroy everything on the forts as well as in the place. Up to this time no reinforcements have come and we are now besieged in the eleventh month. I have no reports from you.

I do not know where the army may be, and I ask again for speedy help, and repeat again the situation is very serious.

After a desperate resistance Fort No. III was captured on December 28th, thus leaving Intermediate Work No. 3 in great danger. General Stoessel called the Council of War on December the 29th to consider further operations. The whole council excepting Stoessel, Fock, Reis, and two or three others out of 22 members, held to the opinion that the resistance should be continued on the first line.

On December 31st a Japanese mine was exploded under Intermediate Work No. 3. General Gorbatovski on December 20, considered it advisable that the garrison should have sand bags ready to occupy the parapet. He considered it the safest way to proceed after an explosion. On the other hand General Fock, in a series of verbose instructions forbade this as a useless proceeding and ordered Gorbatovski to take up positions to prevent with rifle fire and bombs, the enemy from establishing himself on the parapet.

Intermediate Work No. 3 Blown Up and Captured

General Gorbatovski had sent out the scout command of the 28th Regiment to reinforce Intermediate Work No. 3 and had sent report thereof to General Fock who during the whole of the 28th was at the Impane of the 3rd defense line (wall of the enceinte) from which place Fock sent his reply.

It is very unfortunate that you have sent out the scout command as a relief to something which can not be relieved and the only result will be the destruction of the same. I ask you to bring back this command at once to a safe place. The men are dear to us but we are murdering them with open eyes. I ordered that the garrison of the Work be not reinforced—has that been done?

When General Stoessel heard that the garrison had been cut off and were in a desperate situation, he informed them that they had done all that could be expected of them and gave them permission to surrender.

After the capture of Intermediate Work No. 3, the Chinese Wall was attacked. As soon as General Fock learned of the fall of this work, he ordered the commanders of the north and west fronts to send five companies of the reserve to the old town. They were posted on the wall around the enceinte. As a result there remained just forty-five men in the reserve. The attack of the Chinese Wall was beaten off the first time, but at 6:30 P. M. was threatened again. Gorbatovski had

no more reserves, and it was certain that he could not hold that part of the wall between No. III and the Eagle's Nest. He therefore at 8:15 P. M., based upon instructions from General Fock, fell back from the first to the second line of defense.

Owing to the importance of Eagle's Nest, General Gorbatsovski called Captain Galizinski, appointed him commandant thereof, and directed him to hold the position at any cost, and arrangements were made to increase the force at that point. Matters became so desperate finally that General Gorbatsovski, having no orders, asked General Fock if it was intended to take up the third line of defense, since, if it were such intentions, he would like instructions. Fock sent to Stoessel a message to the effect that, inasmuch as the Chinese Wall up to Intermediate Work No. 2 was not vacated by him yesterday, the situation has become so much worse that a successful holding of the prearranged 2nd line of defense on the Un-named and Metrofan Hills, in the opinion of General Gorbatsovski, is impossible. In spite of this, though General Fock ordered him to hold the second line, and informed him that the defense of the 3rd line had been excluded.

Soon after General Fock sent Lieutenant-Colonel Lebedinski, Commander of the 2nd Section, an order to vacate the Little Eagle's Nest, the Kuropatkin Lunette, the Chinese Wall and Battery B, fall back and place himself under the commander of the first section. The substance of this order was transmitted to General Gorbatsovski through whom it had not been sent, and he replied that he had given no one any such order and that under no circumstances was it to be carried out. He then requested verification from the Fortress Commander. General Smirnoff replied that he had given no one any such order and directed that Battery B be held at any price. The Commander of the 2nd Section, owing to the increased hostile fire resulting from the enemy's capture of the Eagle's Nest, etc., reported to General Fock that General Gorbatsovski had not authorized him to vacate Battery B. Upon receipt of this, General Fock wrote an order to the former.

Your Excellency will have to give orders immediately to vacate Battery B. Do not compel me to use other means to have you do this. The Kurgan Battery, the Laperoff, the Wladimir, and Un-named Hill are to be held at any price.

Stoessel Proposed Capitulation to Nogi

On receipt of the report from General Fock, already mentioned, at 3:50 p. m. January 1st, General Stoessel made the following remarks as to the impossibility of defending the wall about the enceinte: "Absolutely correct, there is no doubt about it." Thereupon he directed his Chief of Staff to write a letter to General Nogi proposing to surrender the fortress and asking that officers be appointed to consider his proposal. Negotiations were completed next day and the place passed to the hands of the Japanese on January 2nd, 1905.

General Stoessel then directed the Commandant of the Coast Defense to have a torpedoboat ready with steam up, so that in case of necessity, *important documents and the flags of the troops*, could be saved and taken to Cheefoo. General Fock was directed to gather all the flags and convey them to one place in the town.

The facts herein given embody the statements and opinions of the Russian General Staff in their study of the history of the war as presented in their full report. The details of the events which have a bearing upon the question now under consideration are given in full at times, possibly to a point of tiresomeness but without this a clear comprehension of the subject could not be placed before the reader.

The characters who took part in this great event and influenced it either in its antecedents or during the investment and capitulation of the fortress would have in many ways overstrained any system of organization and administration and it is now essential to look a little more carefully into the characters of the men themselves, who through their behavior and records cover the interesting period now under discussion.

Principal Characters Participating in the Defense

The characters which should be embraced under the above scope of these remarks are the following well known persons already mentioned.

Grand Duke Alexieff, Viceroy, and Admiral of the Fleet.
Lieutenant-General Stoessel, Supreme Commander of the Fortress and the Fortified Zone of the Kwangtung Peninsula.

Lieutenant-General Smirnoff, Commandant of the Fortress of Port Arthur.

Admiral Makaroff, Admiral and Chief of the Fleet at Port Arthur from March 8th to April 13, when he was killed.

Lieutenant-General Fock, Commanding the 4th East Siberian Rifle Brigade, in Command of the General Reserve in Port Arthur from the close investment of the place until August 21, and in Command of the Land Defenses from December 16 to the end of the siege, January 2, 1905.

Admiral Vitgeft, Chief of the Fleet from departure of Alexieff on May 5th, 1904, to date of his death in the battle of the 10th of August off Port Arthur.

As these men were all more or less bound up in the fate of Port Arthur, additional information from new sources concerning them will be essential to determine in how far each may have hastened or delayed the capitulation, and further to ascertain what portions of the disaster were due to personal and what to material and organic defects.

Alexieff was appointed Viceroy in the fall of 1903. He first comes into notice in connection with Port Arthur in the effort made to reduce the new and developing possession to some kind of organization in anticipation of a war with Japan which by the latter half of 1903 seemed inevitable.

He appears to have very limited knowledge of military affairs, and still less of the special military problem into which he was thrust at that time. He appears to have had more knowledge of fleets and ships; and in the foregoing notes it will be seen that he displays a fair appreciation of the mission of the Pacific Squadron in the Far East and had a commander of the same been available such as the records indicate that Makaroff would have been, the fleet might have had a much more enviable record.

Alexieff does not appear to have accomplished anything of importance in connection with his duties at Port Arthur and appears to have had the faculty of mixing things up and of initiating policies that were either harmful or useless. This may be illustrated by his transferring ships' guns to the shore defenses, etc.; organizing siege trains, etc., for the field army when he should have known that supplies, etc., were insufficient as it was; transferring troops from the fortress after the attack and replacing them after a lapse of time with troops which were entirely ignorant of the country in which they

were to operate. It was a case of "swapping horses in the middle of a stream." Many cases of trouble in the fortress may be traced to this cause.

He left Port Arthur after the Japanese began landing at Pitsewo, and just succeeded in getting through to the north and continued to give directions as to affairs at the fortress after he was permanently prevented from returning and as he could not possibly know the existing conditions there his policy was simply one without any value when it was not injurious or impossible to execute. As a functionary he was superfluous.

Considerations Concerning the Fleet

Vitgeft was left temporarily in command of the Fleet when Alexieff left for Mukden and construed this fact to limit his operations with the same. He therefore confined his action to routine work and did nothing of importance in the emergency. He evidently was afraid to take any responsibility in the premises.

At the outbreak of the war, the ship yards and accessories were in no better condition than the garrison with respect to supplies and provisions for a prolonged defense.

Port Arthur was designated as the winter station for the Russian fleet but no steps beyond dredging the west basin had been taken to accommodate the ships, or to provide the necessary equipment for a naval base, such as the case demanded. It was practically in the same condition as when received from China in 1897.

During the Russian administration the large dock had been increased to 452 feet in length but the torpedoboat dock remained the same as when taken over by the Russians and was not large enough to accommodate the destroyers.

A great scarcity of materials for repair and construction of ships existed at the beginning of the war and could not be supplied after the war came on, particularly after the railroad from Mukden had been interrupted.

Most of the skilled workmen and all unskilled men were Chinese employed in the shops before 1894. Finally, about 800 Russian workmen were added to the working force.

The machines were, as a rule, those used by the Chinese, the latest being dated 1899. The foundry was capable of small castings only, and the same applied to forgings. Repairs to the ships, however, went on both day and night.

Friction between the army and navy existed and continued throughout the siege. The military authorities were constantly asking for guns, men, ammunition, electrical and mining equipment. This friction was kept under control while Alexieff was there and while Makaroff was in command of the fleet, but became more and more bitter after the town was isolated.

The 4800 sailors in barracks at Port Arthur were under control of the military authorities and it was difficult for the naval authorities to obtain the required men for the fleet, and the yard. A large number of ships' batteries were landed, particularly from the disabled ships, and placed in positions upon the land defense line and manned by sailors. Searchlights and electric outfits in part furnished by the navy were manned by sailors. Detachments from the fleets worked digging trenches and constructing elaborate defenses. Signal and observation stations were manned by personnel from the ships. In short all positions that required more than ordinary intelligence were manned by the fleet.

Army officers severely criticised the inaction of the navy which some openly denounced as gun-shy. Cordial relations did not exist between Stoessel and Vitgeft. Naval officers dreaded to be intermediaries between them since Stoessel always took advantage of such occasions to vent his ill humor against the navy by swearing at and blackguarding them.

Officers of the navy had had their morale shaken and apparently attributed to the Japanese higher qualities than they deserved and criticised their commander more severely than the circumstances justified.

Nanshan was the key to the defense of Port Arthur. Japanese gunboats and a flotilla of torpedoboats assisted in the attack of the position on the Russian left. On the Russian right the *Bobr* assisted the Russians and caused heavy Japanese losses. When it is considered that a Russian force of 4600 men at Nanshan held a Japanese army of 40,000 and inflicted a loss of 4000 thereon, losing only 690 themselves, while there were 25,000 Russians not engaged, it is reasonable to assume that a larger and somewhat better disposed force could have held it long enough to allow the repair of the warships and permit the co-operation of the ships with the army which would have reduced the critical situation into which the fortress was being forced.

After the battle of Nanshan the feeling between the army

and the navy became more and more bitter each day, the former saying that they could defend the front of the place if the navy would keep the enemy off their backs.

The *Pobieda* was repaired and guns put aboard on June 16th, but eight of her 6-inch guns and sixteen of her 12-pdrs. were retained for use in the land defense by General Bjely who said they could not be spared. Therefore when this ship went out twenty-two of her guns were on shore. The *Persiviet*, *Diana*, and *Pallada* also left some of their guns on shore when they went out to battle. On June the 23rd the Russian ships were pursuing a portion of the Japanese squadron when suddenly the Japanese turned and came at them, whereupon Admiral Vitgeft signalled to make full speed for Port Arthur, and his ships proceeded back to the harbor pursued by torpedo-boats. There was no plan nor any idea of fighting. The Admiral had never before been afloat in command of a fleet.

On June 18 General Stoessel learned that the Japanese had commenced landing another division at Dalni, and asked for the co-operation of the fleet. The Admiral said he would not take the responsibility for going out but that Stoessel might order it out if he chose. It was during this period the *Amur* was stripped of her guns which were put ashore and manned by the ship's crew.

During the last week in July the garrison began to mount some old guns captured from the Chinese in the land defenses and work was commenced on the fortifications of 203 Meter Hill. The guns for the latter were taken from the *Angara*. Close blockade was established about July 26th, before which the blockade had been ineffective.

Advantage was not taken of the ineffective blockade to replenish the supplies for the fortress, and it was only towards the end that efforts were made for this purpose but these were but few and without system. Before the 26th of May, nine out of every ten ships should have passed in and, from that date to the 26th of July, two out of every three should have succeeded in entering; but after the latter date much difficulty was met due to greater vigilance of the Japanese and fear of mines. However, greater efforts to run the blockade would undoubtedly have had fair success. An observer estimates that during the close blockade at least one ship in ten would have gone in. From this it appears that a systematic effort to supply the place would have partially succeeded but events within the fortress indicate that the supreme commander of the place did not wish

that provisions should be brought in since this would have deprived him of one of his strongest reasons for giving up the fortress.

HISTORY AND REPORTS

Another interesting character of the Russian side is that of Lieutenant-General Smirnoff, who was designated to succeed General Stoessel, the Commandant of Port Arthur. Smirnoff is reputed to be one of the best tacticians of the Russian army, but he is also a first rate fighting soldier and his breast sparkles with fourteen decorations, several of them gained in the Russo-Turkish war in which he won great distinction. Funnily enough his name signifies "meek" or "peaceful" but his nickname in the Russian army, a reminiscence of the exploits against the Turks is "Seven Devils." General Smirnoff is a man of fifty; he has commanded both a regiment and a brigade and was formerly Fort Commandant at Warsaw.

On September 27th two junks laden with provisions and boots got into the harbor. On the next day two correspondents of foreign newspapers came into Port Arthur by boat from Chefoo. Their treatment by General Stoessel on their arrival was the cause of some difference of opinion between Smirnoff and Stoessel. After being retained twenty-four hours in the place they were ordered to leave and were captured by the Japanese. (*British Official Report.*)

Nojine's account of this transaction is that they came ashore and no steps were taken to prevent their landing; that in fact Stoessel encouraged them, gave them luncheon, sent them out to the lines and that Smirnoff took up the matter and insisted that they should leave the fortress. Authority in such cases was given exclusively to him in the orders, etc., for the regulation of Port Arthur. Nojine further states that these men were spies and gave the Japanese information.

Very intimately connected with the construction of all the defenses is the organization of the garrison by which they were manned and in this respect the Russian arrangements were complicated by the general plan which had been formulated by Viceroy Alexieff for the operations of the Kwangtung Peninsula. By that plan Stoessel, whose proper command was the 3rd Siberian Corps, was to have command of the field force while Smirnoff was to be responsible for the fortified zone. As soon as the siege became inevitable, it was obvious that this dual arrangement would lead to friction and on July 3rd General Kuropatkin telegraphed to Stoessel to leave Port Arthur on a destroyer. So far from complying with these instructions General Stoessel suppressed the telegram, an action which formed one of the counts against him at his court martial, and as he was senior in the garrison he practically assumed command of the fortress over the head of General Smirnoff. Moreover, further intricacies were introduced in the official hierarchy by the presence of the staff of the 3rd Siberian Corps, in addition to that of the fortress. For instance, so long as the artillery of the 4th and 7th Siberian Rifle Divisions remained in the field it was under Major-General Nikitin, Chief of Artillery of the 3rd Siberian Corps; but as soon as it retired into the defenses, it passed under the command of Major-

General Bjely, Chief of Fortress Artillery. Similarly, Major-General Raznatovski was chief of Stoessel's Staff until, owing to sickness, he was replaced by Colonel Reis; while at the head of the staff of the fortress was Lieutenant-Colonel Khvostov. Next in importance to Stoessel and General Smirnov was Kondratenko of the 7th East Siberian Rifle Division who was placed in charge of the land defenses, in which position he won for himself the love and admiration of his men. Under him were three commandants of sections, Major-General Gorbatovski, Colonel Semenov and Colonel Irman, who were responsible for the infantry of the eastern, northern, and western fronts, respectively. The artillery, however, was entirely independent of these officers for General Bjely reported directly to Smirnov and was in no way responsible to General Kondratenko. His command was likewise divided into three sections, corresponding to the three sections of the infantry defense, which was further divided into seven or eight sub-sections. (*British Official History of the Russo-Japanese War.*)

The peculiar organization of the fortress has already been mentioned. In organization, there were two commanding officers. General Stoessel as senior officer present and Lieutenant-General Smirnov as fortress commander, and each had his own staff. This was bound to cause friction and this proved to be the case. There had been considerable criticism of the conduct of affairs of those in authority, dating from the battle of Nanshan for the defeat of the Russians at which action both Generals Stoessel and Fock were held to be largely responsible. The feeling against these officers had grown as time went on and it was not diminished by the realization of the difficult position in which General Smirnov—who seems to have shared with General Kondratenko, the affection and confidence of the garrison—was placed by the presence of General Stoessel and his entourage. It is not within the province of an official history to attempt to probe too deeply into the causes of, or the justification for, internal dissensions of a domestic nature, but all matters which affect the morale of an army in war are of such extreme importance and so much has already been admitted in the case, by the proceedings of the subsequent court-martial of those responsible for the defense, that some mention of the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Port Arthur can not be avoided. From a perusal of the evidence given before the court, it is evident that not a few errors of omission and the reverse had by this time been committed, which, had they been known by the garrison would have warranted some distrust of leadership, and various books written by officials and others inside Port Arthur confirm the fact that jealousy and intrigue ran hand in hand with incompetence in high places.

To begin with, Stoessel's presence in Port Arthur at that time was altogether wrong both from the point of view of expediency, since it could only hamper the actions of the responsible fortress commander, General Smirnof, and in fact since he had disobeyed the order to leave the fortress received by him early in July. It is true that he had concealed the fact that he had received such an order and its receipt was probably not a matter of common knowledge. But the friction and complications that were caused by the impossible situation created by his presence, needed no aggravation.

General Fock's position was also anomalous. In reality the Commander of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, he seems to have had energies in several directions and, owing to the confidence reposed in him by General Stoessel, to have interfered over the head of General Smirnof, his immediate superior, under whom he was serving. On August 21st he had been relieved by General Smirnof of his command and all duties for disobedience of orders; but Fock continued to issue notes and written criticisms of a nature which created bitterness, aroused alarm, and were subversive of discipline. Thus there arose a split in the garrison within the fortress between General Stoessel and his clique including Fock, and Reis on the one side, and Smirnof, Kondratenko and their partisans on the other. It is quite unnecessary to enter further into the causes of the dispute to appreciate what an effect such lack of harmony must have produced. Though the fortress was not absolutely cut off, news from the outside was so scanty that scandal and rumors were bound to grow. The less that was known of the details and the causes of friction between those in high places the more aggravated, probably, were the rumors current amongst those lower down, and the more harmful was the effect on the morale of the garrison. Nevertheless, in spite of such adverse influences, the spirit of the soldiers seems to have remained undaunted as was proved by the nature of the fighting which took place later on.

General Smirnof at one time asked the Admiral to lend him 600 6-inch shells on hand on the vessels. This caused considerable excitement and discussion amongst naval officers.

The significance of 203 Meter Hill had been foreseen by Smirnof and Kondratenko as far back as April but for some reason nothing was done on this hill until July.

On the 16th of December, after Kondratenko's death, Stoessel appointed Fock as commander of the land defense.

This was done without the knowledge of Smirnoff, who had relieved him of all duties in July, and his appointment to command the land defenses was adhered to in spite of Smirnoff's protest and the announcement to Stoessel that he proposed to take charge of the land defenses himself. By this time Stoessel had completely undermined Smirnoff who was ignored by him from that time onward to the end.

Later Smirnoff protested against the abandonment of the first line of defense, the evacuation of the forts and the various positions, but Fock continued the even tenor of his way without regard to him. Fock always reported to Stoessel as to the impossible condition of the defenses and got the approval of his idea, and the scheme in his mind worked smoothly and quickly resulting in a large portion of the line being given up in the period between the Council of War on the 29th of December and the afternoon of January 1, when the whole east front became no longer tenable and the fortress was placed in condition to surrender under the most plausible conditions and in a manner highly gratifying to Stoessel.

Operations during this period were not referred to Smirnoff. He was generally notified that a certain thing had been done after its execution had been effected and when no act of his could block the development of the scheme for an early capitulation.

The place was surrendered without Smirnoff's knowledge. He could do no more than protest against it; for the resolution of the troops gave way the moment they heard of the proposal to surrender and they could no longer be relied on in case he decided to remove Stoessel by force. For this, small blame can be attached to the Russian soldiers; they had been tried to the limit of human endurance and it is not surprising that the prospect of immediate relief from their sufferings snapped the bonds of discipline.

It is universally agreed that Admiral Makaroff was a man of ability in his line. Even the Japanese noticed the change in the fleet and the defense of the harbor as soon as he came. It was a great misfortune to Russia when he was killed so soon after taking command of the fleet and when he was making such progress in bringing it to an efficient fighting condition. He was the only commander who had the courage to take the squadron out and maneuver therewith at sea.

General Kondratenko was recognized as the active spirit

everywhere and little further need be said of him. He was invaluable in neutralizing Fock's influence with Stoessel. He had the reputation of interfering with troops and problems that did not concern him but there was so much inefficiency that it is really refreshing to find a man who had some correct ideas about his profession and who could execute plans with some idea as to what he was trying to do. There were plenty of commanders on the ground at Port Arthur that needed considerable interference in their methods if any good was to come from them.

General Fock's abilities have already been very well covered and but a word or two more need be said. One simple paragraph will be quoted to compare Fock and Smirnoff. Next day after the evacuation of Fort No. II, the latter met the former and the following conversation took place. Smirnoff says:

Why did you surrender the fort? I would have sent you as many reinforcements as you wanted; I have some 30,000 here in the fortress. By abandoning it you have undermined the root of my principle that no fort should pass into the enemy's hands except after the death of all of its defenders.

Fock in his defense before the Roop Commission replies to this question as follows:

I was amazed at such a question, and that a principle, of which I had never before heard and which is not to be found in any text-book on tactics or field service manual, should be assumed by the Commission to be an irrefutable axiom to ignore which was a crime.

Fock was insulted at the question and expresses his surprise that the Commission should have taken up the matter.

General Smirnoff's character throughout the siege may be measured by his words before the last Council of War on December 29th. After all had expressed their various opinions Smirnoff said:

I have heard everything that has been said on the subject, and I consider it my duty to state that according to regulations there should be in every fortress secret instructions in which the *raison d'être* of the fortress in the theater of war is defined. According to these instructions the Commandant is to be the judge as to the extent to which the fortress has done its duty and fulfilled its mission. Unfortunately, such instructions do not exist in this fortress. One of the objects of this fortress—to extend and afford a refuge and protection to the fleet—ceased when the fleet was destroyed. The other object—to co-operate with the strategical plans of the main army by keeping employed the Japanese army now laying siege to

us—is not finished. No matter what the opinion on the subject may be, the *Regulations for the Guidance of Commanders of Fortresses* definitely require them to hold out till all strength and means are exhausted, which with us is far from the case. Thus we must continue the defense. The scheme of defense conforming to the actual circumstances should be as follows: So long as possible we should hold the Chinese Wall, as far behind it as we can throw hand grenades and fire mines. To strengthen our fighting line we must weaken Liao-tieh-shan and Signal Hill (Fock shook his head and tried to interrupt). I am sure we can hold on to the Chinese Wall for a fortnight. Then we will fall back on the second line, i.e., Tumulus Battery, Vladimir, Mitrofanieff, and Un-named Hills. This line has one defect, that it won't be possible to keep the supports and reserves near it owing to scarcity of cover; but, all the same, we shall be able to hold the enemy for a week. Finally, there is the third line on Stonebroken Ridge, running from the left to the northern portion of the town wall, and from the right to Big Hill. It is at present well fortified, and has directly in rear of it a number of buildings, in which the supports and reserves can get cover. Thanks to the strength of this position, we should be able to hold on for three weeks. By that time our supplies will be running out, and then, not till then (raising his voice), can the question of the fortress's life be discussed.

He finished. Every one remained silent; no one liked to speak. The Commandant had spoken what all knew to be the truth.

Stoessel closed the meeting with the words:

Well, gentlemen, I see that all of you almost are in favor of a further defense, and we will carry it on accordingly. Russian soldiers could not act otherwise. I am extremely grateful to all of you for coming to such a resolution.

These remarks of Stoessel should be taken into account in considering the events which followed within the next three days.

Colonel Irman having been informed by Stoessel that he had surrendered the fortress asked to be sent to Cheefoo on a destroyer. Stoessel flatly refused, saying:

Good Heavens, what are you talking about? What are we to do with all the gold vases? How am I to get them away? Why, the Japanese might get them; we must save them.

Irman replied:

If you want to make certain that the Japanese don't get them, sir, I should throw them into the sea.

Stoessel was referring to the gold vases that he had looted from the Pekin Palace and which he kept in Port Arthur. The questions put to Stoessel when before the Commission of Inquiry are interesting and throw much light on Stoessel's

character and motives. The inquiry is too long to reproduce or refer to further than to say that Stoessel's charges upon which he was tried by court martial were based mainly upon the results of this investigation and the fact that he was tried upon a great number of charges and specifications speaks for itself.

“THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR” (NOJINE)

This book gives a great many details as to the internal operations and conditions that are not found in any other book or publication. Nojine naturally would hear more of the details and being in charge of a paper would gather up the facts and present them in his paper or retain them for the future. He was a warm friend and supporter of Smirnoff and Kondratenko, and supports their action on all occasions.

Stoessel, in his own defense before the court martial, says that Nojine and another Russian correspondent escaped from Port Arthur and that the latter was captured by the Japanese to whom he gave information as to the situation. Nojine says in his book that he left Port Arthur at the end of the siege and went to Cheefoo on the *Rastoropny* as an officer of the fortress with the knowledge and direction of the Commandant and all of the Admirals, and that Stoessel reported to the Russian Consul there that Nojine was a Japanese spy. The two stories do not agree in any particular and are mentioned to introduce the question of credibility between the two. This is an important matter with respect to what happened within the fortress during the year of 1904. The reliability of Stoessel and even his credibility may be judged by the events so far described by the Russian General Staff and confirmed by official documents of that time. In reference to the controversy between Fock and Smirnoff as to the surrender of a fort, the following lines closing Appendix I in the *Truth About Port Arthur* shed some light upon the character of Nojine as compared to Stoessel, Fock, and their clique:

The principle of the non-surrender of a fort should be instilled into all soldiers from the day they join. A good soldier knows that he must be the first to lay down his life for his country in war, and remembers during the whole campaign that success is founded on a clear appreciation of the principle of self sacrifice by all, from Commander-in-Chief to private soldier.

War is a death summons.

Death is the soldier's crown.

Every soldier, that is, in the true sense of the word, is one who is willing to die in the struggle, and sees in death the highest end in his calling. By

this feeling he exalts the morale of his comrades to an extent which insures victory in the end.

Under circumstances of modern war it is more than ever necessary that this should be instilled into the individual as well as into the mass, for the surroundings of a modern battle are more harrowing than they were in days of old. Successful war will be to that side in which this feeling is most deep, which is best equipped, and which possesses the most skilful leaders.

WAR CORRESPONDENTS WITH THE THIRD JAPANESE ARMY

The following extracts are taken from some of the war correspondents who entered the place with the victorious Japanese Army, giving in their first and also in their general impressions abundant confirmatory evidence of the conditions within the fortress.

W. Richmond Smith, Correspondent for the Associated Press and Reuter's Telegram Company

Referring to his first meal in Port Arthur after entering the place.

We were given the best tiffin we had eaten for many a day, including fresh meat, good bread and all sorts of delicacies with abundance of champagne. All agreed that General Stoessel was not the right man, and that he had done the surrendering against the judgment of his best officers in the garrison though it was frankly admitted everyone was glad when it did come, except some of the officers and very many of the men who openly charged many things against General Stoessel after they had marched into the city from the positions and broken their rifles and thrown them into the harbor. * * *

The most remarkable thing about the captured city was the healthy, well-fed appearance of the non-combatant population. The tiffin we had just enjoyed helped to explain it all. There was any quantity of privately owned stores of provisions in the place that could be had for a price, and no besieged city had ever been farther away from anything approaching famine. These statements were in a large measure corroborated by statements made regarding conditions which existed in the besieged city by Russian officers whom I met on board ship returning from Dalni to Japan a few days later. Though their statements in many cases conflicted, there was a startling unanimity of opinion against the conduct of General Stoessel, on the ground that the position could have held out longer, and conviction was also strongly expressed that it would have held out longer if General Kondratenko had lived.

Norregaard, Correspondent for the Daily Mail

In commenting upon the reasons for the capitulation of the fortress and Stoessel's alleged reasons for giving up the place, Norregaard presents the following analysis.

Exclusive of those in hospital, the total garrison in Port Arthur on the

day of surrender consisted of about 27,200 officers and men—the navy included. This force, which is a good deal in excess of what the Japanese estimated to be the total number at the beginning of the siege, would be fully adequate to make a good defense of the large section of the fortress still remaining in the hands of the Russians at the date of the capitulation.

The statements concerning the sanitary situation were also partly misleading. There were no real epidemics of typhoid or dysentery, the total number of cases of the former being forty-three, and of the latter 460. Neither is it true that the stock of medicine and disinfectants had given out. But in other respects the Russian statements are perfectly correct and the condition of the hospitals and the state of health of the garrison undoubtedly greatly influenced the decision of General Stoessel.

* * * * * *

Still, even under the existing circumstances, I do not think that the fortress would have been surrendered, if General Kondratenko had not been killed by an 11-inch shell in the North Kikuan Fort on December 15th. For the name that will go down to history coupled with the defense of Port Arthur will not be Stoessel's. He was from all I can learn nothing but a figure head, a weak and vain man, a martinet, unbeloved by his men, and little respected by his officers. The real man was Kondratenko. Together with Colonel Rachevsky, of the engineers, he had planned the fortifications, and he had worked indefatigably day and night to have them erected and perfected. He was always alert, always in the fighting lines leading and cheering his men, and sharing their hardships, always full of resource, ever able to check a Japanese move by a cleverly well thought out counter move. He was the born leader to whom everybody bowed, and his strong will, wide knowledge, and great personal bravery, made him the soul of the whole defense. He was the idol of his soldiers, who knew his firm intention to continue the fight to the bitter end. When he died, everything seemed to collapse, everybody lost heart and the party which, headed by Stoessel, wanted to give in got the upper hand. The place surrendered wisely perhaps, but not too well—and the defense which might have gone down to posterity as one of the finest feats of arms of all history was shorn of the luster which else would have attached to the memory of Port Arthur.

* * * * * *

The siege of Port Arthur is a grim tragedy, but the most tragic part is that it was not allowed to end as a tragedy. Still it would be fair to forget, because of the weakness of the concluding scenes, the grand masterly drama which the Russians have given to history by their seven months heroic struggle.

*David H. James, of the Daily Telegraph, on the Siege
of Port Arthur*

(From note to General Nogi stating reasons for surrender.)

Sir: Taking into consideration the state of affairs at the seat of war in general, I find the future resistance of Port Arthur useless and in view of the fruitless loss of men I would like to negotiate about the capitulation. * * * (signed) Stoessel.

The reason Stoessel gave for wishing to surrender was, according to the document sent to General Nogi (which might have been written before the outbreak of hostilities, for it bears no date) "for humanity's sake," "to avoid further useless waste of life." From this it would appear that there had been a great sacrifice of life in Port Arthur during the siege, and if General Stoessel's statement had been substantiated by fact, this would most decidedly have been sufficient reason for surrender; but on the contrary there had been no great sacrifice (under 10,000) and there remained a garrison of over 32,000 able bodied men with which to defend the fortress. And when we found out that there was in Port Arthur an efficient garrison numbering two-thirds of the original force besieged, and that there was ample food and ammunition for a full month's heavy fighting, we stigmatised the surrender as disgraceful, and substantiated the statement with facts from the official Japanese returns. General Stoessel flatly contradicted our telegrams and defended his right to surrender in a most remarkably untruthful statement. The defense of General Stoessel was given to a representative of the *Times of Ceylon*, who had boarded the *S. S. Australian* (on which the generals returned to Europe) when she arrived at Colombo.

At first General Stoessel would not commit himself, but when he was shown the telegram of Dr. Morrison, the famous Peking correspondent of the *London Times*, in which the surrender was described as most discreditable and unjustifiable, he denied the charge in its entirety, and gave out, through his personal A. D. C., Lieutenant Nevelskoy, the following remarkable and ridiculous defense. (In order to separate my statements from General Stoessel's I take the liberty of quoting an editorial in the *North China News*, Shanghai, 3rd March, 1905.)

" * * * General Reiss's first statement was as to the actual strength of the garrison on the first day of January last. He said 'the actual number of men still able to carry arms was 8000. We had 18,000 sick and wounded, and besides there were some 4000 non-combatants, including doctors, engineers, electricians, and civilians. During the siege 10,000 were killed outright or died of wounds or sickness. The strength of our garrison at the beginning of the siege was, roughly speaking, 40,000.' "

(Official Japanese report.)

Grand total for the army-----	23,251
navy-----	5,311
civilians-----	3,645
Total-----	32,207
Sick and wounded-----	13,000
	45,207

(Before proceeding further I will note that I saw over 15,000 able bodied men entrain at Chang-ling-tsu, and Nogi's official report above, of the men surrendered, will amply substantiate my statement and give the lie to General Stoessel.)

Further comment would be superfluous.

The statements given by Stoessel or Reiss with reference to food, guns, and ammunition are likewise inaccurate or untruthful and in no way in agreement with the well known facts in the case.

General Stoessel called a council of fortress commanders (council of war) after the death of the hero, but none save Stoessel and Reiss and perhaps another, would entertain the idea of a premature surrender. The Japanese might capture the fortress but it was not to be surrendered to them—this was the spirit of the council.

* * * * *

Had Stoessel intended to defend the fortress to the last he would have followed Kondratenko's plan (as the Japanese fully expected he would), and made some attempt to organize the new line of defense. He did nothing. In fact he had long considered the position hopeless and, as events proved, had decided to surrender on the first provocation. So when the Japanese had obtained possession of Ehrlung, Sungshu, and North Fort and he was forced to quicken his actions and withdraw in to his second line, he found that the opportunity he desired for surrendering had been created. He had previously allowed his left wing to be crumpled up with contented indifference, and then when things were looking black, and without consulting anyone, and even without attempting to count the number of men he had in the hospitals or the strength of his garrison, he assumed that it was time to throw up the sponge, and the prepared document was sent to General Nogi. He had not the courage to face his gallant garrison and thank them for their defense, and bid them farewell in the captivity into which he forced them; and his name was received with scorn by every single officer and man to whom I spoke on the Chang-ling-tsu plain, and they one and all considered his last act as a befitting ending to an arrogant, blustering command usurped and unworthily held.

(In reference to his meeting with Nogi.)

The general looked wonderfully well, with his florid face thinly covered with a grey beard and his thick, well knit figure well seated on his splendid mount. Nothing about him gave the slightest indication of fatigue or worry after the long siege, and he looked for all the world like a well fed Boer Dopper.

There was nothing in the man that suggested confidence, nothing suggesting a leader. He looked what he was, a man of indifferent will, indifferent character, and indifferent ability, for neither strategical gifts, nor military studies had raised Anatole Mikhailovitch Stoessel to the position he occupied.

* * * * *

At 11:25 A. M. the Japanese cavalcade came in sight, and in a burst of sunshine, General Nogi rode up and dismounted, entered the compound and was introduced to Stoessel.

No greater contrast in men can be imagined. The one coarse-voiced, coarse-featured and heavy in person; the other gentle of voice, refined in feature, and keenly alert, with eyes that go into the depths of your soul, bringing out confidence and trust, obedience and admiration, and a man as great in soldierly qualities as he was tender of heart for those he commanded.

The General immediately apologized for the fire that was raging in Port Arthur, which he regretted was due to incendiarism. He hoped the Japanese would soon take over the towns, as the volunteers and laborers were getting out of hand.

* * * * *

From conversations with the Russian officers at Chang-ling-tsu station, and after a careful canvas of the rank and file, I was convinced by the unanimous opinion held, and by the manner in which lips curled when his name was mentioned, that Stoessel was a weak man with a loud voice and domineering manner—a man of no individual character or spirit, apart from bullying. They made it clear that he was inclined to surrender in August, but was prevailed upon not to do so by Kondratenko, who they all agreed, without a dissenting voice, was the sole defender of Port Arthur—had he not been killed, Port Arthur would not have surrendered.

* * * * *

Although not a success, they claimed rightly that the great sortie on the night of the 23rd of August (planned by Kondratenko) was most opportunely made and dislocated the plan of direct storming. Of General Stoessel they said unmentionable things, and but for the untimely interference of a staff colonel I would have heard a little scandal which the court-martial may disclose.

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A few minutes later General and Madame Stoessel drove up * *. The General's appearance was received with marked coldness, and many officers walked off the platform with sneering expressions on their faces.

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The garrison, of course, cannot be held responsible for the disgraceful surrender, and that they were able and willing to fight was proved by their ability to tramp eighteen miles, and their condition and morale at the time of surrender.

Unfortunately the world, saturated with Stoessel telegrams and concocted "Cheefoo-leries" will never be altogether swayed from the first impressions formed about the heroic qualities of General Stoessel; that, time alone will correct.

* * * * *

Truly, the more one thinks of the defense offered by General Stoessel for his disgraceful surrender, the more one is inclined to believe the unfortunate General's mind was temporarily unhinged by fear.

Ashmead Bartlett

Port Arthur—The Siege and Capitulation

(In reference to the fleet.)

* * * It is hard to believe that at the end of October any absolute necessity existed for placing the crews on shore. If it was unnecessary, such an action was inexcusable, for it at once exposed the now precious lives of the sailors to further decimation, and a ship's company would be of little use after two months of such service. This transfer of ships' crews and guns from sea to land service shows better than anything else the unhealthy spirit and lack of moral force which pervaded the Russian Naval Command. Sailors who come to a decision, months before it is necessary to decide, not to fight at sea are not worthy of the name. Yet this was the course adopted by the Russian admirals. All the fight had been knocked out of them on August the 10th and after that, come what might, they were determined not to risk another encounter on their natural element.

* * * * * *

General Stoessel decided to surrender. He only looked for a suitable opportunity; but he could not very well take the step until the enemy had captured some of the permanent works, for it must be remembered that up to December the 5th not a single one of these had fallen. From the date of the capture of 203 Meter Hill the surrender, as far as Stoessel was concerned, was a foregone conclusion. Until December 15th, however, he was not really master of the situation, for Kondratenko still lived, and the spirit and energy of that brave man made itself felt throughout the entire garrison. As long as he was present there would be no talk of capitulation among the soldiers, whatever the Commander in Chief might have privately decided. * * * With his death the spirit of resistance fled but still no decent excuse could be found for capitulation.

On December the 18th the Japanese blew up and stormed the North Keikwansan Fort; this was followed by a similar success on December 28th, when Nirusan succumbed to a determined attack; and on the 31st of the same month Shojusan also fell into their hands. This gave Stoessel the necessary opportunity for capitulation; he seized it with an almost indecent haste, for at 4 P. M. on the afternoon of January 1, he sent his *parlementaire* to arrange a meeting of the delegates. A few days before the capitulation a conference was held of all the fort commanders and the majority voted in favor of further resistance.

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From these facts (determined from the inventory made after the surrender) it will be seen that ample food existed in the store-house to supply the garrison for quite four months at full rations. * * * Moreover, Stoessel himself was largely to blame for this condition of affairs, which touches the question of the food supply as well as that of the hospitals. Incredible as it may seem, no attempt was made at the commencement of the siege to collect under military control the large private stores of food existing in the town. It is true that an order was issued to the effect that all stores of food and wine must be sold to the military authorities at rates fixed by headquarters.

* * * * * *

Stoessel appears never to have realized the importance of keeping the non-military element under control. It is on those who are not engaged in the actual fighting that time hangs most heavily, and the seeds of discord and dissension that constantly spring up in that class may spread with disastrous results into the ranks of the soldiers themselves. General Stoessel stated in his interview with General Nogi that one of his reasons for surrendering was the impossibility of keeping the laborers in order. This is a strange confession for the Commander-in-Chief of a besieged town, with authority of life and death in his hands, to make to the head of the besieging army.

Whenever a feeling of general demoralization is found in a garrison, it can nearly always be traced to the highest in command. General Stoessel's supineness was reflected in the conduct of his officers. The civilians—not perhaps the most reliable of witnesses—declared that on days when it was perfectly well known that an assault would be made, many of the officers were found parading the streets or drinking in the wine shops content to leave their commands to their non-commissioned officers. The latter always behaved admirably while the steadfast courage of the private soldier

rose superior to every hardship and supplied the confidence their commanders failed to inspire.

* * * * *

If Stoessel is to be blamed for his premature surrender, far more blame must attach to those who failed to prepare for war. Especially should Russia have sacrificed every other consideration to render Port Arthur impregnable. Had this been done, the Pacific Squadron might have remained at anchor until the Baltic Fleet appeared on the scene. No nation was ever provided by nature with a finer defensive position and no nation ever took such poor advantage of her opportunities. If a tithe of the time and money spent on making a seaside resort of Dalny had been devoted to the proper defense of Port Arthur, how different might have been the peace which followed the conclusion of the war. If the Russians had fortified the line from Louisa Bay to Taikosan, they could have delayed the progress of the Japanese saps against the forts for months. If the main line of defense had been protected from end to end by permanent forts, such as North Keikwansan and Nirusan, the fortress might never have capitulated, or at least not until after the arrival of the Baltic Fleet. When we consider the desperate character of the fighting which was required before even the most isolated and ill-protected positions were carried, it is easy to understand the price Russia paid for the lack of adequate precautions.

THE COURT-MARTIAL AND ITS RESULTS

Generals Stoessel, Smirnoff, Fock, and Reis were tried by court-martial in the winter of 1907-8. This was three years after the completion of the operations around Port Arthur where the charges had originated. Investigations by committees convened for that purpose had recommended this action.

Lieutenant-General Stoessel was tried upon ten charges, several of which carried several specifications. The reader will have gathered from the foregoing evidence what in a general way was the nature of the offenses. They covered many other details than those herein mentioned, since the details of all his alleged shortcomings could not be included in this discussion.

He was found guilty of the following, which are briefly stated:

Of having surrendered the fortress prematurely.

Of having entered into negotiations to surrender the fortress without having called together the Council of War as required by regulations and in spite of the Council of War that met two days previously, which had passed definitely and adversely upon the proposition of surrender.

Of having permitted General Fock to circulate "Notes" subversive of discipline.

Of having, on December 29th, telegraphed false information as to the situation to the Czar, etc.

Major-General Reis was tried for having knowledge of Stoessel's intention to surrender prematurely, and in assisting in the same by exaggerating the critical state of the place.

Of having prematurely prepared the dispatch of proposal to surrender the fortress.

Of having failed to demand definite instructions from Stoessel as to terms to be accepted in drawing up the agreement of capitulation and accepting articles of capitulation derogatory to the honor and dignity of Russia, etc.

General Reis was acquitted on all charges.

Lieutenant-General Fock was tried for neglect of duty and disobeying instructions in reference to the battle of Kinchou. Five specifications.

Of having left the position of Kinchou and going to the rear to Inchenzy Bay, although he had been instructed that defense of this bay would be otherwise provided for.

Of placing but one of four regiments in the defenses of Kinchou, etc.

Of failing to use his reserves at Kinchou and preventing two battalions ordered up by General Nadejin from joining the firing line.

Of not using every means available and even the bayonet at Kinchou.

Of retiring before dark at Kinchou in violation of the instructions that he had received from General Stoessel.

Of disobedience of orders in not sending reserves to the fighting line as ordered by the Commandant of the Fortress, entering into arguments as to the necessity therefor with the latter and finally not accompanying the last unit of his command to the firing line.

Of publishing a memorandum which was derogatory to the courage and ability of other commanders and subversive of good discipline.

Of abandoning Fort No. II upon Stoessel's authority and not notifying the Commandant.

Of concurring in and assisting Stoessel to surrender the fortress prematurely by abandoning important positions and threatening commanding officers of positions for not obeying his orders when the latter had received positive orders from the Commandant not to give up certain places, and by this action bringing about conditions which placed the fortress in disadvantageous position with respect to the enemy and terms of the capitulation.

General Fock was found guilty of circulating the Memorandum Notes but in view of the great length of time was not punished. He was acquitted of the other charges.

Lieutenant-General Smirnoff was tried upon two charges.

Of suspecting, after the surrender of Fort No. II, the existence of an understanding between Stoessel and Fock to reduce the fortress to such a state as to justify capitulation, and in despite of the responsibility resting upon him under Article 57, etc., *Regulations for the Guidance of Commanders of Fortresses*, did not deprive Fock of his command and did not take energetic action, etc.

Of not having convened the Council of Defense, after having been informed that Stoessel had made proposals to the enemy to surrender and did not insist on compliance with regulations, etc., and not carrying out the decision of the Council of War of December 29, etc.

General Smirnoff was acquitted of these charges.

The culmination of the trial came so long after the offenses that it was hardly probable that evidence at that late date would be easily obtained to effect a conviction on many specifications which alleged actual facts. Now after ten years the evidence that can be collected and is actually available enables one to come to an accurate decision on all of these matters but it is quite probable that a court would not present convictions in a number of cases as charged. Besides many of the specifications that mark the grossest inefficiency, are in some cases vicious errors in judgment but probably are not suitable for the action of a court.

It is not improbable that the court, except in the matters pertaining to the surrender of the fortress through treachery, took a lenient view of the alleged offenses, considering the whole affair as a bad and irretrievable situation felt that it might be well to let by-gones be by-gones.

Stoessel received the death sentence but it was never executed. It was commuted to dismissal from the army and confinement in a fortress for ten years, but he was released after serving about one year in confinement. Efforts have recently been made to present him as a martyr, but with the full information before the reader it is evident that he was not in any sense a martyr.

PART TWO

REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In reviewing the evidence herein presented it is interesting to give a few words to the views held by prominent Russian officials in the early days of the history of Port Arthur, during their efforts to prepare the same for a great naval base. There are a few men connected with it who appear to have had clearly defined ideas on certain branches of the subject, but none have been found who seem to have grasped the project in all its important elements and who were able to put all of these ideas together into a complete whole.

The demand for such a base was fully recognized and its realization would have filled a long felt deficiency in Russia's development and established her as a naval power to be reckoned with in the Far East. The project was one of such magnitude that none but those experienced in military, naval, and political questions could comprehend the whole scheme, and give to each branch proper and sufficient consideration and push the undertaking forward to a prompt and satisfactory completion.

Alexieff appears to have had good ideas as to the requirements and proper functions of the navy, or at least developed them during the war, but his policies, with respect to land operations, generally mixed things up and brought on trouble without end as a result. He appeared to be incapable of considering both branches of the service in the same plan.

The engineers who worked upon plans for the defense of the Kwangtung Peninsula had clear ideas as to what was required for defense but their conceptions as to the fleet and other matters appear to have been limited.

Kuropatkin was of the opinion that strong fortifications should be provided, and used his influence with the Board to prevent cutting down the appropriations for the same, but when the war came his ideas about the place and its defense and the operations of the fleet appear to have lacked clearness and in several cases were erroneous.

Mr. Witte practically ignored the defense of the Kwangtung and worked to develop, at great cost, a magnificent commercial base at Dalni. This could not have been better prepared for the uses of the enemy if the latter had had unlimited means and time at his disposal and had done the

work himself. In a short time it was to be thoroughly demonstrated how mistaken were Witte's expenditures and energy in neglecting the defenses and building the one thing that the enemy would most need in a campaign against Port Arthur. Due to this policy, as stated above, he was soon to lose both Dalni and the fortress and with them the hopes of Russia in the Pacific.

In treating the general problem in the early days it may be observed that there were no well defined ideals in the premises and lack of the same may be accepted as their first serious deficiency. A writer on the subject of efficiency asserts that the first law thereof is that one must have clear and well defined ideals in reference to the matter in question and the results in this particular case amply justify his statement.

Again it appears that when the fortress was occupied lack of definite ideals as to the functions and true rôles of the fortress and the fleet existed, and that each branch of these two services were not in many cases agreed amongst themselves as to the proper procedure. Here then for the second time we find a lack of unity of purpose and national team work which in the end defeated the purpose of both services and struck down the ambition of the nation, notwithstanding the fact that the defense of the fortress was made by one of the bravest and most self-sacrificing garrisons that ever strove to maintain the dignity and honor of a country.

From the foregoing we see that there was no close and systematic co-operation of a military, naval, and national character, so essential to success, and no general team work in the development and construction of the fortress so that when the war came there was much pulling and hauling in different ways and the whole enterprise ended in disaster.

PLANS FOR FORTIFICATIONS

Several boards and commissions were sent to Port Arthur to report upon the general features of the defense. All of these were composed of competent officers who, after careful reconnaissance and study on the ground, reported upon a project, outlined a plan, and estimated the cost thereof.

The configuration of the Peninsula is such that an efficacious defense must be confined to certain lines and positions demanding extensive and elaborate systems of forts and trenches. The scheme recommended was taken up and considered by the authorities in St. Petersburg, almost wholly

upon a basis of cost. The main line of the defenses was to include Takushan, Wolf Hills, and other points or important positions. The cost of the proposed scheme, in the opinion of the above mentioned authorities, would be too great and it was determined that a cheaper system embodying a shorter line nearer to the harbor and naval establishment, should be devised. A committee was then organized composed of the Secretary of War, General Kuropatkin, and the Ministers of State, Finance, etc., who took up the question and sought to solve it mechanically, by reducing the cost and number of men until they came within their ideas as to the proper expense and garrison. The members of this committee were not familiar with the fact that effective defense of a position is determined by the circumstances of the terrain and the probable number of the enemy that can operate against it and that the solution can not be accomplished mechanically by reducing and trimming or by dividing projects and costs into halves or quarters in disregard of fixed natural conditions. In this case, as in so many others, those who decided the matter did so, not upon its merits, but upon the cost, having no conception of the tactical requirements, and by their changes placed limitations and conditions on the extent and positions of the lines which, in many ways, as appeared later, nullified the functions for which the defenses were constructed. It was in this as in so many other cases an effort to get something valuable and necessary for a reduced price or for nothing, and in this, as in all similar ones, the method defeated the end to be obtained. The plan accepted would have answered the purpose well had there been no war; no fortifications, however, would have served the purpose and the demands of economy better; but war was expected, it was imminent, *they were built for war and should have been the best and strongest that could be devised.*

In addition to the reduction to avoid excessive cost, the appropriations became effective in small amounts and were always insufficient. When the war came but a little more than one-third of the amount allotted had been available for the works, many of which were not completed, and many more had not been commenced while the bulk of the armament was not in evidence. As usual, the war came sooner than it was expected; nothing was ready for the crisis, and in the end all was lost. Dalni, ready however, was taken by the Japanese

without a struggle and was of enormous value to them in reducing Port Arthur.

Colonel Velicho's remarks in reference to solving tactical problems mechanically, as in this case, by persons not familiar with all the requirements are pertinent and worthy of the most careful consideration.

The Board having settled the question of the plans, accepted the same as an accomplished fact and bundled up their ideas thereon and laid them away in cold storage for some future day. It was not in this, and frequently is not in other cases, appreciated that problems of the character here in issue can not be determined by the methods of the "bargain counter."

In estimating the number and power of the guns that might be brought against Port Arthur, Colonel Velicho underestimated both. He reckoned upon 144 field guns and 40 siege guns or about double that which the Japanese had in 1894. He had completely overlooked the remarkable decade in the progress of ordnance and gunnery between 1894 and 1904, although he can not be blamed entirely for this since he was exerting his best endeavors to produce a set of fortifications as cheaply as possible. It turned out, however, to be a serious question in the premises. He, believing that only low power guns would be used, reduced the thickness of walls and arches, the heights and thicknesses of the parapets, and the dimensions of other structures, thereby effecting certain economies. These continued economies show that, after having once deviated from standard methods or measures, how easy it is later to deviate again and again therefrom in order to maintain consistency throughout until the whole effort may, to the exclusion of all other considerations, degenerate into one of economy pure and simple. The effect of these matters upon the results of the siege are well known.

ORGANIZATION OF THE GARRISON

In 1903 efforts were made to organize a garrison for the fortress. This was a delay of more than five years after the occupation of the place. There was no hurry about it and it was taking its time. The impending war, however, came at a swift pace and nothing was ready. Many of the troops for the garrison had not yet been designated as troops for the fortress and large numbers of those already there had been ordered to other places by the Viceroy. He wished to

send troops to the Yalu before the enemy should arrive there and took those that were organized and handy. The troops to replace those ordered away did not arrive for several weeks after the outbreak of war.

The interesting items connected with this organization are the evident efforts to bring some kind of order out of chaos. The Grand Duke Alexieff was made Viceroy. The technical troops were organized. The appointment of a fortress commander and fortress staff with the fortress organization and administration, were all accomplished in time but some of them were not ready for use by the opening of the war. For contingencies 3,000,000 rubles were provided, and a memoir was drawn up in reference to the deficiencies and defensive capabilities of the fortress. There was no plan of defense of the fortress on hand and no records from which one could be made.

1. *A fortress engineer administration* was developed after the beginning of the war. This office took charge of works both on the land and sea fronts. Before this the Commandant of the Fortified Zone had no influence over the construction of the works since all of the engineers were under the control of the Chief Engineer of the District; but after the organization of the fortress administration, the Commandant had control of the work.

2. *The artillery administration* was placed in operation at the same time that the other administrations were effected. It took charge of guns, ammunition, searchlights, rifles and ammunition.

3. *The commissariat administration* had been organized for some time but took up active duties only after the Intendant of the District left for Harbin on the 16th of February.

4. *The medical administration* was never fully organized. Had it been properly organized with a suitable head, much suffering would have been obviated during the siege.

During all of this formative period the constant changing around of the garrison caused much confusion. The telegraph and sapper companies were sent away and companies to replace them though badly needed did not arrive till the first or second week in April. The delay in arrival of the telegraph company prevented the erection of proper telegraph and telephone lines, and necessitated erecting the same in a great hurry, and in a temporary manner upon poles or in

shallow trenches which was the cause of serious trouble during the siege. The lines were constantly cut and interrupted by shells and could not be maintained in operation on this account.

The unreasonable and inexplicable shifting of officers and troops at this critical time, from a place where they were thoroughly acquainted with the conditions to another place, or places, and the introduction of others ignorant of the place, had a marked influence upon the efficiency of the command, and had an important bearing upon the final act which took place on January 2, 1905. These movements were entirely useless and an excellent illustration of the danger of "swapping horses in the middle of a stream."

On February 6, 1904, the Viceroy received full discretionary powers as to declaring a state of war in his district, in the fortress, and to ordering mobilization. On the 9th of the same month he acted upon the authority thus received.

It was known to the Viceroy and his immediate staff that diplomatic relations with Japan had been broken on February 6th at 4 P. M., St. Petersburg time, but he did not so inform his commanders until the morning after the attack on the fleet. Had he promptly informed the Chief of the Fleet on receiving that information the fleet would probably have been saved. The torpedoboats that were nightly cruising in front of the harbor had detected the Japanese boats and had come in to report and were in the act of doing so when the hostile boats discharged their torpedoes. These boats were reporting because they knew nothing of the rupture of diplomatic relations, had no orders to attack and there was nothing else for them to do. Had the Chief of the Fleet known the state of diplomatic relations, his general carefulness previously displayed with reference to security indicates that he would have given effective orders against surprise.

On the morning of February 9th, orders were given to erect more observation stations on the coast and connect the same by phone with Port Arthur. Additional methods of protecting the channel from attacks were also ordered.

Kondratenko was detailed to take charge of the land defenses. His great energy brought about astounding results and Colonel Tretjakow and Captain Von Schwartz began to make good headway on the defenses of Kinchou but this work had been delayed so long that many believed the position could not be prepared for defense in the short time available.

Orders for the defense of the fortress were prepared and promulgated. These referred chiefly to: cover, observation of coasts and details therewith, fortification of Kinchou, detail of a rear admiral on the staff of the military commander, vessels to be on duty at entrance to the harbor, co-operation of the shore batteries, removal of guns from the *Angara* and placing other ship guns on shore, placing guns to defend Pigeon Bay, various police regulations referring to the town, and planting mines in Kerr and Talienwan Bays.

The Fleet

Admiral Makaroff arrived on March 8th, and took charge of the fleet where his presence had an immediate effect. Improvement was so marked that within a week a Japanese naval officer had noted and commented upon it. It is believed that had he lived through the campaign that the fleet would have accomplished important results. He appeared to have the true rôle of the fleet in mind and took hold of the same without hesitation or fear of responsibility, and in a manner in marked contrast to his successors who were afraid to make even the simplest movements.

Until the railway to the north was interrupted, the fortress was annoyed by requests of various kinds from the field armies. Supplies and provisions were called for. When Smirnoff arrived, he, as Commandant of the Fortress, issued orders forbidding sending away supplies and endeavored to hold those on hand and increase the stock and this policy was the cause of one of the first differences between himself and Stoessel. The northern armies regarded Port Arthur as a base from which supplies could be drawn.

These facts are presented to show that those in authority had no conception of the real problems and conditions they were about to face. The status of the real function of the fortress in the coming struggle was not taken into account, as the most important element in affording a refuge for the fleet, and through the same gaining, in the end, naval supremacy which would dominate the situation. With this idea in mind the fortress should have been filled up with all kinds of supplies required for a long and serious siege; on the other hand, the policy was to drain it of the few supplies that happened to be in the place when it was first blockaded from the sea. Stoessel and his administration had done nothing to supply.

the place and he endeavored to prevent Smirnoff from saving what was on hand.

Deficiency in Supplies

This is probably the most remarkable of all the numerous neglects that occurred in connection with the place. That no one up to the arrival of Smirnoff, March 17, should have looked after the supplies, especially the food for a long period, is more than remarkable, and it would seem that some one either inside or outside the fortress would have pierced the veil of uncertainty which appeared to hang over the fortress in the early days of the war and would have tried to provide the place with the necessities of life. That the place would be besieged was certain from the start, that the authorities in general did not appreciate this or what it would mean is likewise certain. The records which touch upon the subject at all indicate that Smirnoff did try to remedy the deficiency, and certainly tried to retain what was on hand but was thwarted by Stoessel. Smirnoff's efforts came too late since all available food supplies had already been seized by the northern armies, or had been taken to the north by the natives who were clever enough to foresee what was coming. Several weeks later, about the time of the battle of Kinchou, Stoessel made some small effort to collect supplies by directing that stock should be driven into the fortress.

It is related that the fortress Intendant service did attempt to purchase cattle in Manchuria but met with indifferent success. According to statistics there was abundant stock there and it is believed that with a little energy and system, and with a suitable means of bringing the stock to the fortress, with officers to superintend the work and money to pay with, substantial results could have been accomplished. The omissions herein mentioned are like so many other omissions that perhaps one must not express too much surprise.

Another interesting fact bearing on the same question is that the entrance to the harbor was never wholly closed. In the opinion of a highly competent observer in the town and fortress for several months during the siege, nine boats out of ten would have succeeded in running in prior to the 26th of May, two out of three from that date to the 26th of July and one out of ten after that date. Here was an opportunity to secure supplies that was ignored in the early months and only used spasmodically towards the end and without any plan

whatever. There was no systematic co-operation with persons on the outside.

As Stoessel did not at any time make any real efforts to improve the situation and as he constantly complained of the serious shortage of supplies, it looks as though he did not wish to replenish the same and thus deprive himself of his main argument used later for capitulation.

Surplus Staffs

One of the serious defects in the administration of the fortress, particularly during the early days, was the over supply of staffs and higher commanding officers. During this time there were the Viceroy, the Commander of the Troops; General Wolkow; General Stoessel, the Fortress Commander; the Staffs of the Viceroy, of the District, of the Fortress, to which must be added the Chief of the Squadron, the Harbor Commandant, and the Navy Staff of the Viceroy. From all sides the troops received orders and directions often in flat contradiction to one another. Thus it may be seen that the over-head restrictions were very complex, and the operation of the system was impossible from the standpoint of efficiency. The effect of this cumbersome system is clearly shown during the siege.

Co-operation

A meeting of the Fortress Commander and three admirals was held for the purpose of bringing about co-operation between the military and naval departments. The result of this meeting was that three detachments from the ships were to go ashore each evening, and under the direction of the Fortress Commandant to guard certain places of importance and return to their ships in the morning. Two 47-mm. guns were also taken from the fleet and located on shore.

Smirnoff arrived at Port Arthur on March 17, 1904. He had been appointed by order of superior headquarters, to be the new Fortress Commandant and was to relieve Stoessel who had been appointed to command the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. On March 23rd an order from superior headquarters was received, directing Lieutenant-General Stoessel to:

Assume the direction of the defense of the Fortified Zone of Port Arthur-Kinchou, having under your direction the Commandant of Port Arthur and all the troops in the above mentioned zone.

The Viceroy was authorized to arrange the details of service of the different commands. He telegraphed his own orders thereon to Stoessel from Mukden.

Your Excellency will take over the control of the land defense of the Fortified Zone of the Kwangtung by virtue of which the Commandant of the Fortress is put under your orders. By virtue of the supreme authority given me I entrust you with the rights of Commanding General of an Independent Army Corps, under full control of the Commander in Chief of the Manchurian Army. To the Commandant of the Fortress I give the authority of a Commanding General not Independent. In so far as I give you instructions, I ask that, in defense of the command entrusted to you, you will arrive at some understanding with the Chief of the Fleet.

These orders are of the highest importance in the history of Port Arthur and after obtaining a clear view of the situation, should be read with care; for, in regard to the question of command, the authorities met with an unusual amount of trouble due in a great measure to the complicated system in use and this order did not help to simplify the situation. The authorities seemed to be groping around without any well defined purpose in the provisions which pertained to the fortress and the different parts never ran smoothly together. Each effort to improve matters made them worse. The orders issued to Stoessel and affecting the Commandant were in violation of the *Russian Regulations for the Guidance of Commandants of Fortresses* and the *Orders for the Administration of a Fortress*, and trouble ahead should have been anticipated by the one taking the responsibility of providing a new system for the command and administration of the fortress, without revoking the old system up to that time in vogue.

Conflict of Authority

Hardly a month after the date of the above orders, misunderstandings arose between Stoessel and Smirnoff as to the administration of the place. The Viceroy's orders had violated the *Orders for the Administration of a Fortress* and had curtailed the rights and duties of the Commandant thereof, but nothing had been provided as to the changes and restrictions that had been imposed, leaving the Commandant without any guide and subject to the whim of the higher commander. This lack of definition of the sphere of duties and usefulness of the officers seriously interfered with the daily operations of the fortress, since the Commandant did not know wherein his rights began and left off and the various staffs were

constantly in doubt as to their respective jurisdictions. With this source of friction the bad feeling and the resulting disagreements became more and more aggravated with time and deeply affected the direction and results of the siege.

On April the 27th the Viceroy issued an order, *The Organization and Regulations of the Forces in the Fortress of Port Arthur*. The title of this order sounds forceful and business-like but was of no value in the premises. It prescribes duties and responsibilities of the Fortress Commandant, more or less unimportant, and leaves the substance of the issue just where it was before or worse. The vital principles of command had not been touched; Stoessel's name had not been mentioned and he interpreted the new order as not affecting him in any way, and not applicable to him. He held that his duties were not affected by the order and that he, as senior, commanded the whole and that power given to the junior must come also entirely to the senior. Hence the Viceroy's efforts to smooth down the way to general harmony only added additional questions to the controversy, and the condition dependent on the same went from bad to worse.

An officer placed in high command with its accompanying responsibilities is entitled to clear and definite decisions as to his authority and duties. A supreme commander who knows what is required, can, if so disposed, state his orders and instructions in such language that no room for doubt or argument will remain as to his desires and intentions. If, on the other hand, he wishes to dodge responsibility for what may follow, he may word his orders so as to leave opportunities for "interpretation" and loop holes for his own escape. Ambiguous or indefinite instructions, are, as a rule, the agencies of weak men who have not formed clear ideas of a situation or who wish to avoid the obligations that will follow the execution of any definite policy, and who will shy, even at the ghosts of responsibility should the same happen to haunt them. It is not the purpose here to try to determine what kind of a man the Viceroy was in this respect, but in preparing his order he either did not understand the issue, or dodged it and took a by-path around it. Indefinite instructions pleased Stoessel since he was enabled thereby to encroach gradually upon the domain designated by the appointing power for the Fortress Commandant and, as the former grew stronger in power, he was able to ignore the other and control the situation.

Unity of Command

Soon after his arrival in Port Arthur, Vice-Admiral Makaroff had sent a report to the Viceroy in which he attempted to show that, in a maritime fortress, unity of command was absolutely necessary, and at the same time asked that the Fortress Commandant be placed under the control of the Chief of the Fleet and be required to carry out all of his instructions. The Viceroy had already arranged to carry out this proposal, but before issuing the order telegraphed to General Kuropatkin for his opinion on the question. Makaroff further stated:

That to avoid double command the subordination of the Fortress Commander to the Chief of the Manchurian Army would have to be given up. The connection between the army and the Fortified Zone was already weak.

General Kuropatkin, referring directly to the *Orders for the Administration of a Fortress*, stated that the rights and duties of the commandant of a fortress are laid down therein; that these were adopted by the Highest Authority in 1901; and that at the first trial of the same, he saw no reasons for changing them again. He further states his opinion that it is inadvisable to turn over the fortress to General Smirnoff who has no knowledge of the troops or the theater of war and who has not had any experience in war or in authority, and says:

As the Commandant of the Fortress and the Fortified Zone, up to the isthmus of Kinchou, General Stoessel is named, and subordinate to him will remain all power and means of the defense of the land.

As a result of this difference of opinion between the Viceroy and General Kuropatkin, already detailed to command the army in Manchuria, the question as to command was laid before the highest authority, and the result was the receipt of the telegram of March 23rd already mentioned, which placed Stoessel in command of both the fortress and the fortified zone.

This whole discussion brings up an extremely important subject which has long been discussed but has not been settled. Unity of command would have been highly desirable and advantageous. Had Admiral Makaroff been placed in supreme command and had he lived, judging from his energetic character, it is believed that a much better showing would have been placed to the credit of Port Arthur. In establishing unity of command, the selection of the supreme com-

mander who is to unite and govern all parties and reconcile different interests should hold precedence over all other questions. History shows that but a small percentage of fortresses have presented satisfactory results when besieged, and that in all cases where one has been unusually brilliant, the commanding officer has been a remarkably intelligent, able, and energetic man. The selection of the right man for the job is therefore the most important element to reckon with. Had such a man as Todleben or Denfert been in command, Port Arthur would never have capitulated. As to Admiral Makaroff, one can only judge by his action during the few weeks he was in charge of the fleet. He would have been absent with his fleet at times and could not have commanded in fact. This in the existing circumstances would have been prejudicial to the best results. Kondratenko would, so far as can be judged from his character, have been an ideal man for commandant of the fortress.

High Explosive Shells

The supply of projectiles for so many guns was a serious question. Request for high-explosive armor-piercing shells had been sent forward and the reply came back that there were none on hand. Admiral Makaroff had in the meantime lent a supply to the coast batteries and had reported his action to St. Petersburg. In answer to his report, came the following information.

Armor shells for 25-cm. guns are not to be loaded with high-explosives. There is no means of loading them that does not cause decrease in penetration.

The maximum range for this kind of shell may be taken at 3.2 kilometers and firing beyond that range is useless with this ammunition.

Firing at a moving fleet at more than 10 kilometers is not worth while on account of the expenditure of ammunition and the wear on the guns.

This message caused the assembling of a special board consisting of Admiral Makaroff, General Stoessel, General Smirnoff, General Bjely (Chief of Artillery) and Grand Duke Cyril Vladimirowitsch. They prepared a collective telegram which was sent to the Head of the Navy Department. It stated that in the opinion of the individuals signing:

The Artillery Headquarters had not gone into the question of use of projectiles with sufficient detail, otherwise their recommendations not to reply to the hostile fire would not have been made and the board considered that the shells requested were absolutely necessary for the coast guns and, in spite of the theoretical deductions of Artillery Headquarters,

requested that the shells be supplied and fired at ranges compatible with the ballistic properties of the gun.

This ended the matter. The shells were not sent and the ships lent their own to the coast batteries.

Here we find five responsible officers of the highest rank begging for the proper kind of shells and Artillery Headquarters, several thousand miles away, sending instead *theoretical considerations*.

The size and number of the docks were found deficient and the ships and boats had to be repaired in the harbor without docking. There further existed deficiencies of material and machinery so that important repairs could not be made.

Ships' Guns Placed in Land Defenses

On April 15 the Viceroy ordered that 188 guns be removed from the fleet and mounted on shore with a supply of ammunition for same. This order caused some excitement on board. It surely appears to have been poor economy to build powerful ships just for the purpose of conveying a few guns to this fortress where the guns of the ships were to be used solely for land defense, and in protecting a refuge for the fleet. For this reason many of the ships were deficient in the smaller caliber guns on going out to battle on various occasions. This whole procedure indicates again a lack of definite ideals in reference the proper functions and rôle of the fleet in the existing premises. The policy of the makeshifts resorted to at Port Arthur—if it may be called a policy—indicates lack of any definite plan and became a hit or miss method of robbing one department to pay another.

Landing at Pitsewo

On May 5th the Japanese commenced their landing at Pitsewo. On this day about 10,000 men were landed when the operation was interrupted by a typhoon. The whole defense at and around Kinchou and to the rear up to the time of the close investment of the fortress, is simply a splendid illustration of "how not to do it." It would be useless to give details here. They are to be found amply explained in the report of the Russian General Staff. The fiasco at Kinchou and the evacuation of Huinshan by Fock's Division and his orders to return next morning to the same after receiving a suggestion to return thereto from Stoessel; the return of Fock's command to the position before the Japanese had

discovered his absence; and the fact that the position was actually held for one month from that date are enough to characterize the whole as a campaign "incredible."

It would be unfair to any system of command and administration to judge it by the execution of movements in this campaign. No system could bear up under it.

Guns at Kinchou

General Kuropatkin in a letter to Stoessel speaks of the guns mounted at Kinchou and recommends dismounting them before the enemy might have a chance to capture them, and removing same to Port Arthur by train. In this suggestion he appears to have very hazy ideas of the conditions there. They would be of no use unless used in the critical stages of the attack; if removed before this, they would not be of use in the defense and, if thus used therein, it would then have been impossible to save them in case of defeat.

Army and Navy Co-operation

On one occasion of many where the co-operation of the fleet was requested, General Stoessel made a special request for its assistance, and finally Admiral Vitgeft agreed to send out some gunboats. A little later General Stoessel insisted that the fleet should put to sea. Good reasons were presented by the Admiral for remaining within the harbor. Here we have the case of a fleet commander who constantly presents reasons for not taking the sea; and a general commanding the fortress, who knew nothing about the subject, constantly insisting that the fleet should go out. The result was a deadlock that was not easily broken. The Admiral and senior naval officers held that to leave the harbor would subject the fortress to grave danger of attack from the sea, while the Commandant felt that the presence of the fleet was subjecting the fortress to grave dangers from attack by land. There was a meeting of the high commanders of army and navy and all expressed their opinions freely as to the duty of the fleet under the circumstances. Naval officers thought it would be dangerous to go out and leave the harbor while army officers thought the fleet should go to sea and play its part in the struggle and assist in the broad general campaign, the success of which depended upon Russian supremacy on the sea. From this discussion it would appear that the army officers had more clearly defined ideas of the true rôle

of the navy than did the officers thereof who were determined to remain in port.

Stoessel finally took up the matter with higher authority. He was determined to shift from his shoulders what he considered his responsibility in the matter. He held the view that the fleet's departure from the place would reduce the necessity for holding the fortress to the bitter end and was shaping all things for an early surrender. He received an answer to his question from the Viceroy in a short time in which he was directed to maintain an energetic defense of the fortress to the last; to maintain it as a refuge for the fleet; he was informed that the fleet was wholly under the command of the Chief of the Fleet and would go out only in accordance with the latter's judgment and that under no circumstances was the fleet to be sacrificed to secure the safety of the fortress. These words are most definite and show a clearer insight into the reasons for the being of the fleet and its purpose than anything formulated up to this time.

Stoessel Relieved from Command

Two telegrams arrived from General Kuropatkin for General Stoessel. The first was an answer to one from Stoessel in which he had been worrying about not getting reinforcements and about the relief of the fortress. The second was an answer to the numerous reports of the battle of Kinchou and the conditions existing afterwards. In these he had in a maudlin way begged for immediate and strong reinforcements—at least three divisions and a cavalry division—and continued to lament over the failure to relieve the place and was anxious to know when it would take place. Kuropatkin in his answer, gave Stoessel some comparative facts as to the strength of his and the opposing forces; showed him that he had nearly as many men as the enemy and the advantage of strong fortifications; explained the uselessness of trying to relieve the place before sufficient forces had been concentrated to accomplish the purpose with certainty; and finished with some good advice as to the subject of not becoming down hearted and ready to quit before he had fulfilled certain obligations, etc., as to resistance and injury to the enemy and exhaustion of his own supplies. In answering this rebuke Stoessel became very meek and claimed that his intentions had all been misunderstood.

The exaggerated and in fact untrue account of the

Kinchou affair in Stoessel's reports had caused many doubts in Kuropatkin's mind as to the advisability of leaving Stoessel longer in command at Port Arthur. These doubts were further enhanced by reports made to him by two general staff officers who had come to army headquarters from Port Arthur.

Vitgeft had been requested to forward his estimate of Stoessel and the situation at Port Arthur. He replied as follows:

According to my conscience I have reached the conclusion that General Stoessel does not entertain strong reliance in the means at his disposal. He changes his conclusions and his attitude very quickly, being influenced by circumstances and personalities just then about him. His authority depends only on his rank. His entire hope for saving Port Arthur is wrapped in the departure of the fleet. For a personal command in the field he is suitable, but not for a fortress.

However much one may differ from Vitgeft's estimate of Stoessel as to his suitability for command in the field, the accuracy of his estimate in reference to the fortress must be admitted. The Viceroy was in accord with General Kuropatkin as to the advisability of removing Stoessel but wished to have Vitgeft's opinion and when that arrived the former forwarded to the Czar a letter dated June 23rd, in the following words recommending his removal:

It is to be regretted exceedingly that General Stoessel has not justified the hope placed in him. He, personally, has lost confidence in a successful defense of the fortress, also has caused this trust to waver in his subordinates, and has further expressed his doubts to the Viceroy as to the possibility of successfully defending Port Arthur stubbornly with its garrison. General Stoessel has sent reports direct in which he states that the number of projectiles in the fortress is very limited and further understated the supply of same in the fortress. The result of these reports, which were given credence, was the cause of the march southward of Stackelburg's detachment without sufficient preparation being made.

On June 16th Captain Odintzow was sent by Stoessel with penitent explanations showing an abject state of mind and practically retracting what he had said about conditions in the fortress. Kuropatkin then saw that no dependence could be placed in Stoessel's reports and that most decidedly he was not fit for the command. Kuropatkin then sent him the telegram, with a copy for Smirnoff, notifying him that inasmuch as his work in connection with the fortified zone was finished there was no longer any need of his remaining, and directing him to leave the place and join the army in Manchuria. The two telegrams came to Stoessel on June the

18th and Stoessel directed his staff to consider these telegrams as not received and remain silent concerning them. Smirnoff knew nothing of either of them. The latter learned of the circumstances from Kuropatkin after returning from Japan where he had gone as a prisoner of war.

Stoessel did not acknowledge receipt of the telegrams and it was only when a second one came and a written order to the same effect dated July 2nd that an answer was sent in which the positive necessity for his remaining in Port Arthur was presented, owing to the conditions there and the great difficulty of getting away was made an excuse for not complying, finishing with the remark that if after these reasons have been considered and it was still desirable that he should leave he would consider it his duty to obey the order.

Stoessel Forbids Sorties

After the investment of the fortress the next five months were active ones for the garrison. The friction already existing between Stoessel and Smirnoff continued to increase and incompetency and insubordination were always in evidence. Fock's secret letter or report to Stoessel as to the uselessness of sorties, and referring especially to that of the night of August 29-30, undertaken to recapture the east Panlung fort caused much bad feeling. The effort had failed and Fock in this secret report characterized this and similar efforts as useless and injurious to the morale of the command. The General Staff in commenting on this effort speaks of the recapture of the place owing to the nearness of the same to other works as a matter of extreme necessity. Upon receipt of the secret letter Stoessel issued an order forbidding such sorties without his personal permission. Fock was directly under Smirnoff but there was no way at that time to discipline Fock, and later he did several other acts equally bad or worse which were encouraged by Stoessel. On August 30th, in view of the decisive repulse of the first general attack of the Japanese which Stoessel had reported to the Czar he was notified that he had been appointed aid to the latter. After this it was believed that Stoessel was vested with additional authority and he became more arbitrary than ever. Whether it was correct or not it was generally believed that the special favor conferred by the Czar authorized him to speak directly in the latter's name and this impression had injurious effects upon the personnel of the command.

Stoessel Reports Scarcity of Artillery Ammunition

On September 23rd Stoessel made a report to the higher authorities and to the Czar in which he said:

Ammunition I have not received, the saving of projectiles whose supply is becoming less, robs us of the opportunity to combat with success the artillery of the enemy, and to cause his assaulting columns heavy losses. The troops fought heroically. All, to the last man, are impelled by a strong will to hold Russia's bulwark in the Far East to the last drop of blood. The near exhaustion of the ammunition supply, however, threatens to make all of the exertions of the defenders in vain.

On September 30th he again reports progress of events and finishes with the statement:

The ammunition asked for on September 20, has not been received.

Just how, or by what route he expected this ammunition to reach him in this time is not stated. This constant harping on the deficient supply of ammunition was evidently intended to prepare all minds for the coming collapse of the defense when it could be made to appear that the ammunition was exhausted. The skilfull way in which he always presented the weaknesses of the defense and the exhaustion of supplies is worthy of special study. Stoessel and Fock both had a mania for placing large charges of explosives under works and preparing to blow them up as was mentioned in reference to the works at Kinchou. On October 29th a Council of Defense was called to consider the state of Forts Nos. II and III. Fock believed that these forts would soon be taken by assault and urged the necessity of preparing to blow them up. Stoessel directed the Commandant to prepare for this and further added to those, Intermediate Work No. 3 and Kurgan Battery, all of which were to be blown up as soon as the enemy should enter them. The work was partly executed on Fort No. II but was postponed at request of the Fort Commandant for fear that the troops holding the place might themselves be shaken thereby and confidence lost.

On December 22nd, in a report to Kuropatkin Stoessel writes:

My situation here is difficult, the supply of ammunition is exhausted, only a small portion of the men are healthy, the number of defenders is less each day. The 28-cm. shells destroy everything, on the forts as well as in the fortress. Up to this time no reinforcements have come and we are besieged in the eleventh month; I have no reports from you. I know not where the army may be. I ask again for speedy help and I repeat again the situation is serious.

It is not clear what he expected to gain by this and in fact it looks as though he did not expect anything. Admitting the truth of all of his statements except that referring to ammunition which was not true, nothing was to be gained by this kind of pleading. He suggests nothing, puts up a despairing and unmanly plaint and rings in the question of ammunition once more as a kind of dying statement; the shadows of the coming event are cast before as a kind of warning to the world.

Preparations for Capitulation

After the fall of 203 Meter Hill and the destruction of the fleet, commencing on December the 6th events moved rapidly. Kondratenko was killed on the 15th. Fort No. II was evacuated by Fock on the 18th, No. III was blown up and taken on the 28th, and Intermediate Work No. 3 was captured on the 31st. Evacuations and surrender had gone on like clock-work after the death of Kondratenko and although Fock had to threaten at times to use force to compel the abandonment of some of the works as Battery B, and although he had other difficulties in reducing the 1st defensive line to an indefensible state, on the whole it may be said that he was having great success in carrying out his and Stoessel's purpose to surrender. The details of all the indications that justify this conclusion are too numerous to present here but the main facts have been selected from the report of the Russian General Staff and presented in the body of these notes, and have almost in every detail been confirmed by independent reliable sources.

On the 29th Stoessel requested the Commandant, Smirnoff, to convene the Council. Discussion therein showed that Stoessel desired the meeting for the main purpose of considering a proposal to surrender. Other matters were discussed but this was the principal reason for the meeting. The Council in a proportion of more than 2 to 1 decided that any such proposal or discussion thereof was premature and this decision appeared to be mainly due to the speech and influence of Smirnoff, who was determined that the fortress should be held to the last. The Council adjourned, Stoessel apparently acquiescing in the decision. On the third day thereafter, and after Fock had successfully reduced the defenses to such a state that a number of the important lines were untenable, Stoessel sent to General Nogi his undated proposal for

capitulation, without notifying any one except members of his Staff and General Fock. News of the proposal came to General Smirnoff by accident and in the same manner to many others in high command.

The highest tribunal which in case of surrender of a fortress had jurisdiction found the supreme commander responsible and guilty of the decision to capitulate and of capitulation; but nevertheless in its findings said at the same time:

That never in the history of all times was there such stubbornness of defense as was shown by the command of General Stoessel, besieged by land and sea by superior forces, and that the whole world was astonished by the heroism.

There has never been any question of the heroism of the garrison and had the high officers in command, as a whole, been able to show the heroic qualities exhibited by the remainder of the garrison, or even half such courage, devotion, and patriotism there would have been no court-martial and no adverse criticism upon the character of the defense, no disgraceful capitulation and probably a different history for Russia.

This finishes the reference to the operations of the siege. There remain but a few comments upon Stoessel and Smirnoff for the purpose of establishing the relative integrity and credibility of the two men. In the main object for which this investigation was taken up it is a matter of some importance as to which of them stood for the right policy and how they affected the strength of the administrative system and whether the failure was induced by the characters involved or by the defects inherent in the system.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

General Stoessel was 56 years old at the beginning of the war, and in reference to experience and command should have been in the prime of life. He had been in the district of the Kwangtung for several years and should have known the country well. He used to state at times, apparently in contempt of the subject, that he knew nothing of fortifications and such warfare, that he was a "fighting infantry general" and it might be inferred that he preferred that kind of duty. It is presumed that he had some kind of a previous record in his profession, possibly made in the Turco-Russian war but no accurate statement to that effect could be found. Whatever he may have been before the siege of Port Arthur, he

did nothing there to indicate that he had any special fighting qualities. In 1903 he was at Port Arthur in command of the 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division, when he was appointed Commandant of the Fortress that was being organized there. On the day after the night attack upon Port Arthur and the fleet, February 9th, the Viceroy and he had a session. What was said there is not known but the former must have decided to relieve him; for an order was issued February 15th from supreme headquarters relieving him of the command of the fortress and assigning him to the command of the 3rd Siberian Army Corps. He was to be succeeded by Lieutenant-General Smirnoff, who started from Warsaw for his new station on February 25th, 1904. Stoessel did not leave at once and on March the 23rd he was appointed to command the Fortified Zone of the Kwangtung, and Smirnoff, as Commandant of the Fortress, was placed under his authority.

General Kuropatkin appears to have favored Stoessel since he expressed his opinion strongly against turning over the fortress to Smirnoff without restrictions and through his influence and recommendations was instrumental in placing Smirnoff in a subordinate position. The Viceroy evidently intended to give Smirnoff independent command.

Later when Stoessel's unreasonable gloomy and false reports were received concerning conditions at Port Arthur after the affair at Kinchou, Kuropatkin changed his mind and decided to recall him from Command of the Fortified Zone which was at that time practically reduced to Port Arthur.

Whether Kuropatkin changed his mind or other events made him refrain from further efforts to get him out of Port Arthur is not known but nothing further was ever done in the matter and Stoessel remained and continued in command of the place. As no higher authority ever took up the matter and as Stoessel had stated the case for future consideration it may be taken as equivalent to a revocation of the orders relieving Stoessel. All higher authority knew of the situation and acquiesced in the same. Stoessel, therefore, remained Commandant of the Fortress with Smirnoff subordinate to him. After Kuropatkin's previous experience with Stoessel's exaggeration and untruthfulness it seems impossible that he could have accepted Stoessel's letter at its face value and decided that it would be best to leave him there.

After the first general attack upon the fortress and the

decisive repulse Stoessel lost no time in informing the higher authorities of the same and, as previously stated, he at once received an appointment as aid to the Czar. This had a great moral effect on the garrison and may have effected Kuropatkin's action in reference to the orders relieving Stoessel. Further, Stoessel appears to have had influence somewhere at court and appears to have been on some kind of close relations with the royal family. His success in evading field service and his ability to remain in the fortress in spite of all the efforts of those in authority to remove him shows some occult agency working for him.

When he left the fortress he accepted parole and went to Russia instead of going with his troops to Japan as a prisoner of war. When asked by the Roop Commission of Inquiry why he took from the fortress thirty-eight cart loads of his private property in violation of military regulations, he answered that he did so by permission of the Emperor of Japan. When asked by the same commission why he did not go to Japan as a prisoner of war, he answered because he was ordered not to do so by her Imperial Highness the Tsarina. This was based on the fact that she had sent him a telegram saying that she would be glad to see him in Russia. He was a gruff man apparently without tact or ability for which he tried to make up by long winded bombastic speeches, blustering treatment of his inferiors, and protestations to the effect that they would "fight to the last man," "to the last drop of blood," and similar expressions. He was a blusterer, and a swashbuckler of the first order.

Smirnoff had a good reputation on arriving at Port Arthur. So far as could be learned his reputation, character, and ability had never been questioned by any one and all indications are that he was a man of high and praiseworthy ideals. The only time that any reflection was made upon him was when Kuropatkin protested against giving him absolute control of the fortress, saying that he was unknown to the troops and unacquainted with the theater of war, and without experience in war in authority. From this it may be assumed that most of his service had been with the staff. We find in Cassell's history that he had commanded a regiment in the Turco-Russian war and later was Commandant of the Warsaw Fortress. These details are not essential, however, in the present study which is inquiring more as to the efficiency

of Smirnoff and Stoessel in the existing premises in which both were-star actors and engaged in the same drama. In this question is involved the whole subject of command in a fortress, and extraction therefrom of the basic principles and influences to be used in erecting a new structure to cover future cases.

In the long and bitter controversy Smirnoff appears always to have acted upon sound principles. No adverse criticism has been made by anyone upon his command; with a man constantly interfering in little things, revoking his orders on matters within the recognized jurisdiction of the Commandant, being ignored and having subordinates appointed in defiance of his remonstrance and authority, and apparent endeavors to harass him in every way, as did Stoessel; and finally to see the fortress sacrificed through conspiracy between his immediate superior and his subordinate next below him; is it not remarkable that he was able to accomplish anything? His record from a military standpoint seems secure. From his first difference with Stoessel about permitting supplies and food to be taken from the place, to his last protest against the premature capitulation, he appears as a man on the right side.

His efforts to fortify Takushan, and persistence in fortifying 203 Meter Hill and his offensive on many occasions to recapture important places like Takushan and the Panlung Works, all of which was at first criticised or ridiculed, and later forbidden by Stoessel, show that he had at least some qualifications for the position he held. His stand before the Council of Defense and the Council of War on December 8th and 29th against the discussion even of the proposal to surrender, mark him as a patriotic man and the sentiments expressed on these occasions are such as to warm the heart of every patriotic soldier. Evidently these remarks in each case greatly influenced the members of the Council and carried the majority with him. He went as a prisoner of war and remained in Japan until released after the treaty of peace was signed.

The foregoing authorities show Smirnoff, through no fault of his own, to have been placed in the most difficult and delicate position in which a military man can be placed—in one of responsibility without commensurate authority, and under an incompetent blustering commander who was doing all in his power to neutralize the former's efforts even to the

revocation of orders issued and destruction of authority over his subordinates. When Smirnoff arrived and assumed command of Port Arthur it was evidently the intention of the appointing power that he should be the Commandant of the place, in which capacity he was provided with *Orders for the Administration of a Fortress* and *Regulations for the Guidance of Commandants of Fortresses*. Both of these are special and of such character that one not having some knowledge of fortifications would be likely to ignore them and reduce all questions to the narrow gauge of his own experience. Stoessel was that kind of a man, and did not at any time during his connection with the place, show any special capacity for command. He had strong reasons for suppressing the telegram and copy thereof sent to Smirnoff and for remaining in Port Arthur which now can only be surmised. He evidently had prejudices against joining the Manchurian Army. Smirnoff found himself, thanks to the juggling of orders, in an undefined status which held him responsible for certain results but limited his authority in the accomplishment of the same. Many orders were published for the purpose of interpreting and correcting this situation but all of them seemed to miss the main point in the case and instead of improving, made matters worse than before. As the case stood Smirnoff could scarcely be held responsible for anything since his status was one not covered by the orders and regulations governing the normal cases and nothing had been prepared for his special guidance.

In the end Smirnoff was tried for failing to take action to prevent the reduction of the fortress to a critical condition, when he suspected a compact between Fock and Stoessel to reduce the same to such a state that an early capitulation would be justified, and this in spite of the responsibility resting upon him under Article 57 *Regulations for the Guidance of Commandants of Fortresses*; for not depriving General Fock of his command; for not having convened the Council of Defense and not insisting on compliance with the above mentioned rules; and for not insisting on continuing the defense in compliance with the decision of the Council of War.

Unless these charges were preferred against General Smirnoff for the purpose of exonerating him they simply amount to word painting. The regulations apply to the senior officer of the fortress who is *de facto* the commanding officer of the place. Smirnoff's orders placed him second in

command and finally Stoessel took over all authority, but during the whole time the exact status of Smirnoff was never defined. He could not, therefore, except by mutiny and force take the responsibility for overturning his superior's actions; he could not relieve Fock, who had been appointed by Stoessel over his head and in spite of his most urgent protest against it; and he could not call the Council to reverse the surrender of the place because Stoessel in defiance of its decision to fight on had secretly and by virtue of authority as senior officer made the proposal to surrender. Just how it was expected that Smirnoff should have acted otherwise in the circumstances is not explained. It appears to be a case where Smirnoff was to be considered commandant whenever anything was found to be unsatisfactory but when anything required authority he was not to be so considered. It was a convenient and plausible theory for those who had dodged the main issue in all of this controversy, but it would not hold in law. Smirnoff was acquitted.

THE SYSTEM USED AT PORT ARTHUR

The facts brought out above in reference to Port Arthur and its command and administration are valuable in showing many things to embody in a new system of administration and many things to avoid. The practices and policies in this system that should be retained and used in a new system are rather limited but those of the opposite character are equally valuable. The whole system of administration used is embraced in the foregoing with sufficient accuracy to give one an excellent idea what it was and how it succeeded. All the well established facts can be studied to advantage, and those which are found to be good accepted and those found to be otherwise rejected. It is fortunate for one studying this question and seeking to draw up a new system that this great siege took place, for amongst the debris and the after explanations "of how it all happened" may be found enough material, information and basic principles to aid in the development of an efficacious system.

The struggle for the mastery of Port Arthur was a great one and elucidated many principles of fortress and other warfare. Neutral nations are fortunate in having the results thereof presented to them without having to make the experiment themselves, leaving thereto only the necessary study of the remains and history to secure the value of its teachings.

The study, however, must be careful and thorough and the deductions based upon the actual combat conditions, to the exclusion of purely theoretical considerations. It is scarcely possible that another example of equal magnitude and value will be produced in the present or even the next generation. In fact, but few have been provided in all time. Careful study should reveal methods and principles that should make for reliability and stability in a new system.

With the Russian orders and regulations for government and command of fortresses one would think that questions herein raised would not cause trouble in a place like Port Arthur; that the different persons responsible for the operation of the different elements would fall into their places naturally; and that the place would proceed on its mission automatically, effectively, and quietly. For such result they thought they had prepared themselves, but, on account of conditions and situations not normal, vexing questions of every description projected themselves into the problem unaccompanied by regulation or precedent and persistently remained there. In explanation of these facts it appears that occult influences must have been at work, ever quiet and invisible but none the less active. There was no reason for assigning Stoessel over Smirnoff, apparent in the problem, thus departing from the general case contemplated by the Russian regulations; the special case thus created required special regulations and rules which were not forthcoming and would have been unsatisfactory had they been provided. It was another case of "swapping horses in the middle of the stream" without any purpose, unless to favor Stoessel, which in view of the stake in issue was wholly unjustifiable. If in such cases those directly concerned could take the view that the simpler the organization the better will be the administration and will act on that axiom, such disasters as that of Port Arthur would be prevented.

Kuropatkin surely must have known something about Stoessel when he insisted on having Smirnoff placed under him and had he known enough about him to justify such a recommendation as he made in his favor he must also have known, in a degree, at least his general character and some of his disqualifications. In any case Kuropatkin did not appreciate the question of "command of such a fortress" or he would have seen that the combination, which through his endeavors was effected, could not be successful. It is possible

that Kuropatkin did not grasp the importance that this fortress would assume in the war and did not feel that it would be necessary to consider the matter very deeply. In any case he made a mistake in his selection and recognized the same after three months and issued orders to correct it but did not insist on compliance therewith and thereby made a second mistake more serious than the first—allowing some external consideration to interfere with his duty. When he finally had adjudged Stoessel as unsuited to the command assigned him, it is strange that he should permit any considerations other than those relating to military efficiency to influence his action.

The organization of the executive branches in Port Arthur, upon which the administration of the place depended, was unnecessarily complex. General Kuropatkin, the Viceroy, Stoessel, and the Highest Authorities all issued orders in a way which caused confusion and at times uncertainty. The Viceroy had certain authority which does not appear in definite terms and it is not clear as to what was the line of precedence in authority. He also represented both the sea and land forces and sought to bring about co-operation between the two but his efforts were ineffectual. In the fortress it is not clear just how far his authority extended. He was a kind of Governor of the Amur District and presumably would have the whole district under his command both as to land and naval forces but this is by no means clear. The Chief of the Manchurian Army also had considerable to say and his authority appears to have been parallel to that of the Viceroy. The scheme of authority seems not to have been well worked out and it may be doubted if the authorities had ever thought of the necessity for a scheme of authority for such circumstances as suddenly arose at Port Arthur on February 8.

The numerous and apparently distantly related authorities, giving orders without any well thought out system and without consistent team work, constituted one of the most serious if not the most serious drawback to success at Port Arthur. The situation at Port Arthur belongs to a class of problems that are special and require certain special solutions. The situation concerning fortresses in war was well stated by Smirnoff before the Council of War December 29th. Therein he mentioned: (1) *Secret regulations should be found at every fortress stating the reasons for the existence of the fortress and its relation to the theater of war.* (2) *The duties of the Com-*

mandant in reference to the fortress and the theater of war. (3) The Regulations for the Guidance of Commandants of Fortresses definitely require fortresses to hold out until all their strength and means of defense are exhausted.

Here are three principles which evidently were not appreciated in the case of Port Arthur by any of the high commanders except Smirnoff and were probably not known to the others. These are basic and should be the ground work of all "Regulations for the Guidance of Commandants of Fortresses."

Von Schwartz who passed through the entire siege and was active and energetic in the defense, lays down important principles that demand the most careful study and which should be introduced into the regulations of every scheme of fortress defense. After criticising various efforts by various authors to define the length of time that a fortress should hold out and analyzing all of them, he states without qualification that a fortress should *exist only for the purpose of offering a stubborn resistance until the end of the war*. It requires but little thought to show that this is the only conception in the premises that offers satisfactory results and should be the first condition imposed upon the garrison on mobilization, and if the same enters a contest with that understanding a natural pride in achievement will grow up inside of its walls and the determination to effect such an issue will gather increased force and momentum as time goes on. All propositions as to equipping forts for a certain length of time and ideas or schemes for holding out for one, three, or six months, are based on erroneous premises and are almost certain to bring with them disaster. It may be briefly stated that any limits as to time in such cases appeals to the negative side of human endurance which was illustrated upon a large scale at Port Arthur. It was the main motive throughout all departments of the Russian army that Port Arthur should be relieved; it haunted them by night and by day, while the garrison within the fortress, indulged in reveries of the same by day and dreamed thereof by night. The soldiers had been so imbued with this idea that when they heard a rumor that the place was to capitulate they abandoned their positions, threw away their weapons, cast aside all ideas of discipline and began those disgraceful scenes which marked the end. After this there was no longer a possibility of maintaining the works had the rumor proved to be false. This is the reason Smirnoff gives

for not trying to arrest Stoessel and his followers and continuing the defense. It was clearly impossible. Thus the idea of being relieved and of quitting after a limited time, weakens more and more the heroic qualities in man as time goes on and inevitably leads to the scenes enacted at Port Arthur or their equivalent in some other form.

Makaroff, in his discussion as to the unity of command of the fortress, touches the heart of that and every similar situation. It was clear that "unity of command" in reference to the army and navy where they are operating together or in the vicinity of each other is desirable, but in the same argument and forwarded by the Viceroy, the latter emphasizes the fact that:

To avoid a double command, the subordination of the Fortress Commandant to the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Army is required to be given up. The connection between the army and the fortified zone is already very weak.

In fact the bond between the two was so weak that communication was precarious and did more harm than good. The fortress would have been better off had the connection been cut much sooner. As the question stood after the first few weeks, nothing was accomplished and communication with the outside world simply gave outside authorities opportunities to interfere in questions and situations which they did not and could not understand thereby embarrassing the defense.

Von Schwartz also touches upon this question. After discussing the resistance that should be expected of a fortress says that the *commandant should be given independent command*. This appears to be sound doctrine whether judged by general reasoning or by concrete cases of Port Arthur and other conspicuous examples of sieges. When a place is once cut off, and this may be expected at any time, no one outside of the place can possibly estimate the situation and give appropriate orders; and the sooner this is recognized in the struggle of a fortress and becomes its breath of life, the better for its operation and success. In case of an interior fortress having a well defined mission in the theater of war, it is clearly impossible for its commandant to carry out the same if other forces are permitted to pass through and other commanders to give orders and make demands thereon which it was never designed to satisfy, or to give orders affecting the one purpose for which the place was constructed. It requires clearly de-

fixed ideals for the establishment and uses of fortresses and they should not deviate therefrom for any other purpose until their legitimate function has been fulfilled. *Therefore they should be independent, prepared to close up at any moment after the commencement of hostilities, and the garrison filled with the spirit that does not expect relief until the end.* This requirement means that a definite policy must be established and maintained in reference to fortresses and the supply thereof not left to chance and the possibility of completion after the opening of hostilities.

The Russians made two mistakes in the administration which might have been avoided even in the unprepared state of the fortress: (1) *In not selecting a man with suitable qualifications, who understood the mission of the fortress and would act accordingly.* (2) *In not turning over to him full responsibility for the execution of orders and regulations and the secret mission pertaining to the fortress and instructing him that he must not base his defense upon any prospects of relief.*

The administrative staffs were unnecessarily complex and top heavy. There was, for this reason, a dearth of stability in the operations. Had the Commander of the Manchurian Army, the Viceroy and his staffs, and Stoessel and his staff been entirely eliminated from the control of the place, particularly after the first interruption of the communications to the north, the history of the place would have missed a large amount of the adverse criticism which it now bears. The organization of the military forces of Port Arthur and the administration of the same would have been simple and, had the eliminations suggested herein been made, the remaining staff would have had some chance in the struggle in which it was engaged.

The organization of mobile forces for field service is not, as a rule, adapted to fortress warfare. Their organization into divisions, brigades and regiments, mean nothing in closed fortresses where, in most cases, there is not room for maneuvers as organizations and where such maneuvers are useless. This is a matter which is more significant than may appear at first. The forces by the nature of the case are to be split up into small bodies, frequently not larger than a company and scarcely ever larger than a battalion, and the larger commands are simply an embarrassment to the place. Flexibility in such cases is fundamental and often reorganization upon a provisional basis becomes necessary.

The commandant of a fortress should be selected especially for the particular case and should be a man who, in case of a siege, would not be deterred from doing his duty by poor or no prospects of being relieved by outside forces. In case of an interior fortress he should be a man experienced with troops and have a good practical knowledge of fortresses and their true functions in a given theater of operations, and, in case of maritime fortresses, must, in addition to the above general requirements, have a personal and practical knowledge of maritime and land operations and understand the true rôle of the fleet and be able to co-operate therewith. This last question came up on all occasions at Port Arthur when the two services came together; and the lack of such general understanding and the general inactivity of the fleet were prominent elements in the failure of the defense of the Kwangtung and the collapse of all military operations therein.

In the present controversy it is clear that the Commandant of the Fortified Zone was not a suitable person for the great but delicate mission entrusted to him. This becomes so apparent as one reviews the history of the siege that one is forced to the conclusion that his disposition, character, narrow-mindedness, and lack of sympathy with co-ordinate branches of the service, such as the navy, must have been known to the appointing authorities, and that such personal characteristics were serious disqualifications for such a command.

The staff for an officer in command of such a station will and does in a general way suggest itself, and in the present case, if restricted to that of the fortress commandant, would have answered the requirements of the case. If, at any time, new or unusual duties should be required of the staff, a new member of the staff should be designated for that duty; and should the opposite effect be observed, a member should be relieved therefrom. Sufficient members are required on such a staff but not more; the matter should be adjusted by the commandant.

Not counting the town and civil administrations, there were organized the following administrations of the fortress staff:

An engineer administration.

An artillery administration.

An intendant administration.

A medical administration which was never wholly de-

veloped. It was defective in not having a central organization and was decidedly deficient during the siege. In addition, there was the Commandant's personal aids and staff. A rear admiral was attached to Stoessel's staff and in his absence this officer should have been assigned to the staff of the Fortress Commandant.

The artillery was organized into batteries in the usual way, many of them were badly placed and were neutralized very quickly after the beginning of the bombardment and do not provide us with the information that otherwise would have been realized therefrom. This administration was also seriously affected by the failure of the telegraph and telephone lines, often at the most critical times and again we do not secure the valuable lessons that should have been presented.

The infantry defense was divided into two fronts; the east and the west. Each front was divided into a number of sections which were commanded by officers of suitable rank directly responsible to the commanding officer of the land defense. These arrangements are the simplest and the usual methods of dividing up the commands. The section commanders were all connected with the commander of the land defense and had the intelligence lines been satisfactory the scheme would have been entirely acceptable, but the hostile shells cut the wires and knocked down the poles and interfered with its operation. The artillery line was also divided into two fronts and each of these into sections, but in some cases there were more divisions than the number of same in the infantry defense. The defects in the fire-control lines constantly interfered with the artillery fire. The Artillery Chief was reached only through a common switchboard connecting with other branches and messages had to follow party lines in many instances. The result of this was that at the most critical times orders to batteries could not be transmitted and failure to use the artillery was the result, at other times it was too late when actual connections were made and batteries received their orders.

It has been impossible to include all of the smaller but interesting details connected with this question. There are many that throw additional light on the issues but they must be omitted and the facts included here restricted to the main principles.

The foregoing is ample to convey to the reader that there were many mistakes made before and during the great siege. For those made during the siege officers connected with the fortress were as a rule responsible. For the others many are responsible. When the errors are definitely stated they generally show, or at least suggest, the responsible person. To assist the reader in this part of the subject those which the writer believes were the important ones are enumerated under "Conclusions."

CONCLUSIONS

In this memorable siege it is easy to point out definitely many mistaken policies, deficiencies, and errors. Some of these refer to the antecedents of Port Arthur, some to the periods of preparation after the opening of hostilities, and the remainder to the time of actual investment and capitulation.

The foregoing study reveals many short-comings of a national, material, military, administrative and personal nature, most of which with a reasonable amount of care and knowledge may be eliminated in the future. Those of a national and personal nature will be more difficult to treat and may be found intractable. The personal element should, with proper attention to selection of the commanding officer as to qualifications, of professional fitness, good judgment, clear and complete grasp of the situation, and high integrity obviate this particular trouble. In this connection, it must be remembered that the commandant of a fortress, which may be invested, can not be recalled should investment occur and it becomes evident that a mistake in his selection has been made. The question, therefore, of selecting a commandant for such a position is a complex matter and in fact the most important one connected with the subject.

National characteristics existing at the time are not likely to be altered by the imminence of war, and if inefficient methods have been followed by the people up to that time nothing that can be done then will be likely to improve the situation. Anticipation of the difficulty and preparation beforehand are the only remedies.

Disregarding the many small matters which influenced the fate of Port Arthur, the following seriously affected the result adversely and merit mature consideration.

1. The conspicuous absence of definite ideals as to the military problem of the Kwangtung Peninsula, and lack of national team work pertaining thereto.

2. The rejection on account of cost of the scheme of fortification therefor, prepared and presented by expert engineers who had been over the ground and had carefully analyzed the conditions and requirements of the positions.

3. The production and acceptance of a modified scheme of fortification selected by a commission made up of Cabinet Ministers who had never been on the ground and who had had no experience concerning questions of this character.

4. The determination of any system of defense whose principal merit was embodied in low cost regardless of efficiency.

5. The folly of spending enormous amounts for commercial structures and facilities at Dalni, within easy reach of an active and well known enemy, before substantial defensive works had become effective around Port Arthur.

6. The folly of half-measures, in a case of such importance, thereby inviting attack and reduction of the place in a short time, to the confusion of general strategic plans. It would have been better not to have fortified at all.

7. The reduction of limit of cost to such a low figure as to necessitate construction of inferior walls, parapets, and other structures.

8. Slow and insufficient appropriations to execute, in a reasonable time, such defenses as were to constitute the approved project.

9. Apparent indifference and neglect in reference to hastening the works and preparations in general.

10. Under-estimation and contempt of the enemy.

11. Under-estimation of the enemy's siege artillery and parks, and heavy ordnance that might be brought against the place, and making no allowance for improvements in ordnance for the ten years from 1894-1904—making fortifications only sufficient to withstand guns of the earlier date.

12. Delay of the Viceroy in sending information of the highest importance to the high commanders, thereby leaving them in ignorance of the fact that diplomatic relations had been broken off on February 6, and the situation extremely dangerous.

13. Exchange of troops at Port Arthur, thereby filling

positions with new men wholly ignorant of the country and the situation soon after the commencement of hostilities.

14. Misconceptions as to the relations of the blockaded fortress to the Manchurian Army, pursuant to which the fortress was being used as a base for the army and drained of its men, armament, and supplies.

15. Failure to collect supplies for a siege which was certain, and neglect of the opportunities to introduce same after the blockade, and during investment.

16. Over-organization and excess of administrative staffs and too many high commanding officers present.

17. Appointment of an officer over the commandant of the fortress, with undefined duties, in violation of orders and regulations devised for such cases, and the misunderstandings and trouble resulting therefrom.

18. Unnecessary complexity of administration.

19. Disagreement as to the right of command of the fortress.

20. Failure of the supreme Commander of Fortress and Fortified Zone to maintain harmonious relations with the Chief of the Fleet, and at times antagonizing the same.

21. Lack of co-operation between the army and the navy, and no system of command by which co-operation could be secured.

22. No high-explosive shells for coast guns and serious deficiency in ammunition for field and other land defense guns of the fortress.

23. Deficiency in guns for land defense necessitating removal of guns from the fleet, and use of obsolete guns taken from the Chinese in 1894.

24. Efforts of authorities in St. Petersburg to satisfy demands for high-explosive shells for seacoast guns with theories as to the uselessness of using them.

25. Insufficiency of docks, cranes, etc., for the fleet in the harbor.

26. Shallow entrance to harbor necessitating delay of ships until high tide in order to go out or in.

27. Ships going to sea to fight leaving some of their guns in the land defenses.

28. Fleet commanded by officers who had never been in command of a squadron at sea.

29. Officers in command of torpedoboats and destroyers who had never had any service on such vessels.

30. Gross tactical blunders connected with the hostile landing near Pitsewo, at Kinchou, and in the retreat from the latter to Port Arthur.

31. Instructions recommending the dismounting and removal to Port Arthur of guns mounted in works at Kinchou for fear they might be captured by the enemy.

32. Relief of Stoessel from command of Port Arthur when he had shown himself incompetent, failure to compel him to comply with his orders, and permitting him, though known to be unreliable and incompetent, to control the fortress until he surrendered same prematurely on January 2, 1905.

33. Fock's continued disregard of discipline in reference to writing memoranda and notes subversive of discipline, and final disregard of Smirnoff to whom he was directly subordinate.

34. Defective intelligence lines within the fortress due to hasty erection after war began.

35. Basing practically all military operations upon a proposed relief of the fortress, trying to control same from St. Petersburg and Headquarters of the Manchurian Army, instead of making thereof an independent command relying upon its own resources, and permitting operations connected with the fortress to dominate the military situation.

In closing this discussion one's memory naturally runs back to the remarks made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs when the Commission of which he was a member was considering the defensive project for the Kwangtung which had been submitted by a Board of Engineers, and which was cut down by the Commission and finally accepted in reduced, modified, and less costly form. In discussing the question of defense and particularly in speaking in favor of reduction in cost, he used the following words:

One must not forget that the principal defense of Port Arthur—since the Russian flag has been raised there—does not depend on those troops and guns that may be there, but on the fact that all nations know that behind this place all Russia stands.

In this case as in many others the old axiom asserted itself that the flag in itself does not defend a fortress or any other place and that it is valuable for this purpose only in proportion to the number of men and guns immediately available. This axiom, however, in this as in other cases was

passed by with closed eyes so that the glaring and unwelcome truth might not be seen. The place held out just in proportion to the number of men and guns available in the crisis and the preparation and organization that enabled them to act together. Yes, all Russia did stand behind Port Arthur but so very, very far behind, that the place fell before Russia could strike a single effective blow for its safety.

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